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PRIORITIES OF CREDITORS UNDER JUDGMENT
CREDITOR'S BILLS
JUDGMENT creditors 1 unable to satisfy their judgments through resort to
courts of law soon sought equitable relief, first to discover assets of their
debtors and then to apply such assets to their judgments in the absence
1. The term "creditor's bill" has been applied to various types of suits by
creditors. There is the ancient bill brought to procure payment of a deceased
debtor's obligations. See LANGDELL, A BRIEP SuavEV OF EQurry JUIUSDICTXON
(2d ed. 1908) 125 et seq. There is also the general creditor's bill brought to
obtain a general administrative receivership of a debtor's property. See 1
CLARK RE CEVERS (2d ed. 1929) §§ 190 et seq. And there is the so-called judg-
ment creditor's bill. In fact, any bill brought by a complainant in the capacity
of creditor might be termed a "creditor's bill." Though it is sometimes aszerted
that a bill to set aside a fraudulent conveyance is not a judgment creditor's
bill (Comment (1931) 29 MicH. L. REv. 1057), this discussion is generally
applicable to such bills.
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of effective legal execution.2 In creating a remedy for this class of com-
plainants, equity developed rules of priority comparable to those at law,
and wherever several creditors sought the same property of their common
debtor preference was given to the alert.3 Yet, despite the fact that it
was soon determined that such preference should be given, the rules ap-
plicable in determining the order of precedence among competing creditors
are not yet clearly settled.
With a number of claimants asserting various legal and equitable liens
on, and rights to, the same property of their common debtor or obligor,
the question of the order in which their claims are to rank assumes con-
siderable importance. In determining the order of superiority, emphasis
is generally placed upon the order in point of time in which the liens or
rights are perfected. This is none the less true despite the fact that certain
types of liens or rights are held to relate back to some date prior to that
upon which they are perfected, and others are held to take priority from
and after the date upon which they are perfected as of a previous date.
4
Hence in determining the relative priority of a judgment creditor 1 under
his bill, the first step is to ascertain when the lien accruing from prose-
cution of the suit is perfected. However, it is also important to learn
when a creditor is entitled, by bringing his creditor's bill, to establish
a lien which is for his own benefit exclusively, or for the exclusive benefit
of a limited number of creditors of his choosing; for many bills are allowed
to lie wherein any lien accruing therefrom is for the benefit of all credi-
tors, or wherein the rights of all parties in interest are fixed at the same
instant of time.
Prerequisites to the Acquisition of a Lien for the
Complainant's Sole Benefit
Though it is stated as a general proposition that a creditor cannot
bring a bill to reach his debtor's property without having first procured
a judgment against the debtor,0 there are a number of exceptions to the
rule. Many such exceptions are statutory, such as where the debtor is
2. Clark, Receivers at Instance of Judgment Creditors (1930) 17 VA. L.
REv. 45, 46.
3. Kent, C., in McDermutt v. Strong, 4 Johns. Ch. 687 (N. Y. 1820) at 691:
"Though it be the favorite policy of this Court to distribute assets equally
among creditors, pari passu, yet, whenever a judicial preference has been estab-
lished, by the superior legal diligence of any creditor, that preference is always
preserved in the distribution of assets by this Court."
4. As for example certain mortgages of after-acquired property, and pledges
of rents and profits as added security for mortgage debts in most states. See
infra note 60.
5. As used herein, the designation of judgment creditor and judgment
creditor's bill is used to distinguish the type of bill under discussion from the
other types mentioned, there being no purpose to restrict the discussion only
to the case where the creditor has a judgment, so long as he is entitled to the
same priorities as if he had one.
6. GLENN, THE LAW oF FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES (1931) § 77.
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a fraudulent transferor 7 or an insolvent corporation.8 Aside from statute,
exceptions have been freely recognized in the case of consent receiver-
ships of corporations, 9 and in cases where the non-residence or absence
of the debtor renders it impossible or impracticable to obtain a judgment
at law.'0 While the entertainment of a creditor's bill in aid of legal
attachment might perhaps be classed as another exception, the possession
of a legal attachment lien by the complainant in such cases is in itself
a sufficient ground for equitable relief without extension of the theory
of relief upon which judgment creditor's bills are based.
But the mere fact that a non-judgment creditor may, because of the
facts of the particular case, successfully bring a creditor's bill, does not
mean that he can thereby demand the same priority as if he had recovered
a prior judgment at law. On the contrary, many non-judgment creditor's
bills are entertained solely on the theory that any lien accruing therefrom
is for the pro rata benefit of all creditors of equal rank. This is par-
ticularly so in the case of non-statutory consent receiverships of corpora-
tions, where the rights of all parties are fixed at the commencement of
the proceedings. Statutes authorizing non-judgment creditors' bills
against insolvent corporations provide for the same result.1 Further-
more, statutes allowing non-judgment creditors to set aside fraudulent
conveyances sometimes provide that the relief granted is to be for the
-benefit of all creditors equally.'2
Whether a non-judgment creditor's bill is sustained despite timely ob-
jection thereto or because of lack of it, the right of such a creditor to
claim that the lien resulting therefrom is for his exclusive benefit depends
upon the attitude of the courts of the particular jurisdiction, and upon
the prevailing statutes. As has been indicated, if the bill is allowed
either as a statutory or non-statutory application for a general or ad-
ministration receivership, the complaining creditor, whether with or with-
out a judgment, is not from the very -nature of the bill entitled to a lien
for himself alone or for himself and any limited group of others of his
choosing. But where the bill is not an application for such a receiver-
ship, a non-judgment creditor may sometimes acquire a lien for himself
alone despite the absence of a judgment.
In some states there exists by statute the remedy of "equitable attach-
ment" or "equitable garnishment." 13 In North Carolina it has been held
that the mere joinder of law and equity under the code amounted to the
7. Id. § 76.
8. See 1 CLARK, op. cit. supra note 1, § 232; 2 id. § 706.
9. 1 id. § 188.
10. See 38 A. L. R. 269; also see generally 1 CLAmc, op. cit. supra note 1,
§§ 187 et seq.
11. See supra note 8.
12. See, e. g., OHIO GEN. CODE (Page, 1926) §§ 11104, 11106.
13. See Glenn, op. cit. supra note 6, § 93; also see Snyder v. Smith, 185




creation of a provision for "equitable attachment." 14 In other states
such attachment may be allowed in instances where the court feels that
the absence of a judgment is justified.' 5 Wherever "equitable attach-
ment" is allowed, either by statute or otherwise, unless the effective date
of the lien and the relative priorities of creditors are fixed by statute,10
Sthese matters are determined in the same manner as if the complainants
were judgment creditors filing judgment creditor's bills' 17
But in perhaps the majority of jurisdictions, a non-judgment creditor
is not entitled to priority from his suit, even though his bill is allowed
to stand's and though it contains a prayer for application of the debtor's
property to the complainant's claim.19 Instead, the resulting lien is for
the benefit of at least those intervening creditors who offer to share the
costs of suit before the property in question has been declared subject
to the debtor's obligations. In such cases, pro rata distribution is ordered
among the complainants and intervening creditors, even though the pro-
perty in question has none of the aspects of a trust for all creditors
ratably.20 But where other creditors have not intervened until after the
property of the debtor has been declared subject to the claims of creditors,
there is a persuasive argument in favor of holding that those bearing
the risks of the litigation should be the first to gain from a successful
outcome.
21
Not only does the non-judgment creditor incur the risk of having the
benefits of his suit divided among other general creditors but he also may
be subordinated to intervening judgment creditors. This may occur even
where he asks for a general receivership if the court will not recognize
under the facts the existence of a trust fund for the benefit of creditors
14. Hancock v. Wooten, 107 N. C. 9, 12 S. E. 199 (1890), following up
Dawson Bank v. Harris, 84 N. C. 206 (1881). See also Smith v. Summerfield,
108 N. C. 284, 12 S. E. 997 (1891).
15. Plummer & Davis v. School District No. 1, 90 Ark. 236, 118 S. W.
1011 (1909).
16. Statutes allowing non-judgment creditors to set aside fraudulent con-
-veyances sometimes provide specifically for pro rata distribution; see supra
-note 12. See Snyder v. Smith, 185 Mass. 58, 69 N. E. 1089 (1904) as indicating
that under the Massachusetts "equitable attachment" statute something more
than would be necessary to create a lis pendens is needed to effect a lien.
17. Plummer & Davis v. School District No. 1, supra note 15.
18. Equity will frequently intervene to make property available to the payment
,of debts, but in many such cases property taken into the custody of the court
is held for the benefit of all claimants regardless of the desire of the complainant
to effect a priority for himself.
19. City of St. Louis v. O'Neill Lumber Co., 114 Mo. 74, 21 S. W. 484 (1893);
Rieper v. Rieper, 79 Mo. 352 (1883). The unwillingness to give non-judgment
creditors a priority has caused at least one court of equity to refuse to intervene
to perfect a legal attachment lien unless the suit should be made for the benefit
of all; Hunt v. Field, 9 N. J. Eq. 36 (1852). As to intervention of equity to
protect attachment liens, see GLENN, op. cit. supra note 6, § 85.
20. Day v. Washburn, 24 How. 352 (U. S. 1860).
21. Cf. Clark v. Figgins, 31 W. Va. 156, 5 S. E. 643 (1888).
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generally.22  Yet, despite the fact that the complaining non-judgment
creditor may obtain no priority over intervening creditors, his suit may
prevent a transfer of the property by subjecting it to a lien for the benefit
of himself and other intervening creditors.2
Where the complaining creditor has obtained a judgment at law, still
other legal proceedings may be necessary to entitle him to a lien for his
sole benefit. It may be sufficient if the complainant has had execution
issued,24 but more often, execution must have been issued and returned
unsatisfied.25 If the requirement of the particular jurisdiction has not
been met,2 6 the bill will be dismissed in the event of timely objection, and
the complainant will clearly secure no priority from his bill. But whether
the requirement has been met or not, it has been held that if the objection
is not raised in time, a judgment alone without execution issued is suffi-
cient to entitle the complainant in a non-statutory proceeding to a pri-
ority from his suit.27 Perhaps a contrary result would be reached in a
statutory proceeding in aid of execution on the theory that a statutory
requirement of a return nvlla bona is jurisdictional and cannot be waived.2 8
It is hardly necessary to state that the complaining creditor need have
no lien on the property sought before instituting his suit.20 Analogizing
the relief granted under a creditor's bill to the levy of execution at law,
the courts declare that since a judgment alone without a lien is sufficient
to entitle the judgment creditor to a lien on property levied upon at law,
so it should be sufficient to entitle him to a lien on property levied upon in
equity. As a matter of fact, inasmuch as the possession of a prior lien,
although imperfect, would be grounds for equitable aid without resort
to the theory on which judgment creditor's bills are based, the term
"judgment creditor's bill" might well be confined strictly to the case where
there is no prior lien.
When the Lien Attaches
Where a bill in the nature of a judgment creditor's bill is allowed,
whether the lien resulting therefrom is for the benefit of the complaindnt
alone, for the benefit of him and a limited number of others of his choos-
22. Merchants' National Bank v. McDonald, 63 Neb. 363, 88 N. W. 492 (1901).
23. See Hines v. Duncan, 79 Ala. 112 (1885); Shuck v. Quackenbush, 75
Colo. 592, 227 Pac. 1041 (1924).
24. Freedman's Savings & Trust Co. v. Earle, 110 U. S. 710 (1884); GL=Nur,
op. cit. supra note 6, § 81.
25. Id. § 80.
26. Perhaps the requirement of issuance alone is preferable. Id. § 81 quoting
Freedman's Savings & Trust Co. v. Earle, 110 U. S. 710 (1884). For the pre-
requisites under the New York Statute see N. Y. Civil Practice Act, §§ '773
et seq.
27. Sage v. Memphis and Little Rock Rr. Co., 125 U. S. 361 (1888).
28. Cf. Russell v. Chicago Trust and Savings Bank, 139 IlL 538,.29 N. E.
37 (1891).
29. Freedman's Savings & Trust Co. v. Earle, 110 U. S. 710 (1884); Davidson
v. Burke, 143 Ill. 139, 32 N. E. 514 (1892).
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ing, or for the benefit of all intervening creditors, the rules applicable
in determining when the lien is perfected 30 are apparently the same. Yet,
because of the fact that even races of diligence rarely end in Garrison
finishes, there have been few cases in which it has been essential to the
decision to fix with great precision the exact moment at which the lien
created by a creditor's suit is perfected. The result is that the applicable
rules have been well-nigh submerged beneath a welter of generalities in cases
where great exactness was not required. Thus the usual statement that the
creditor's lien dates from the filing of his bill 31 is probably not true, at
least in a literal sense,32 in most jurisdictions. Instead it should be said
as to property not subject to legal execution at the instance of the com-
plainant, that the lien arising from the suit is perfected at, and dates
from, the instant at which a lis pendens is created with respect to the
property sought to be reached.33 Of course in the case of statutory pro-
ceedings in aid of execution, the statute may provide for an order of
precedence varying from that which would obtain were the test of lis
pendens applied.8 4 But aside from this, the only clear cut departure from
30. The lien is "perfected" in the same sense that an attachment or execution
lien is perfected. If the plaintiff is denied relief on the merits of the case, or if
the suit is abandoned, the lien is dissolved. It is none the less perfected though
it is subject to being defeated.
31. See, for example, Freedman's Savings & Trust Co. v. Earle, 110 U. S.
710 (1884); Sage v. Memphis and Little Rock Rr. Co., 125 U. S. 361, (1888);
Metcalf v. Barker, 187 U. S. 165 (1902); Sitley & Sons v. Morris, 67 Atl. 789
(N. J. Eq. 1907); M'Dermott v. Strong, 4 Johns. Ch. 687 (N. Y. 1820).
32. See Comment (1929) 29 COL. L. Rav. 504, 505 to the effect that the ex-
pression "filing a bill' is merely the usual way of referring to the "commence-
ment" of a suit in equity, and is not used to fix the precise point at which the
lien attaches.
33. Hardwicke, L. C., in Edgell v. Haywood, 3 Atk. Rep. 352, 357 (Ch. 1746):
"If, therefore, after the judgment, or even after the fieri facias, the debtor has
assigned this bona fide, and for a valuable consideration, and without notice, It
would be good and prevail against this creditor. But after a bill brought and a
lis pendens created as to this thing, such assignment could not prevail."
"When Tilford and Anderson brought their suit in rem, the lis pendcns was
an equitable levy, and entitled them to priority"; Tilford v. Burnham, 7 Dana
109 (Ky. 1838). See also Hines v. Duncan, 79 Ala. 112 (1885). For the oper-
ation of lis pendens in general see 2 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (4th ed.
1918) §§ 632-40. As to the parties necessary to be joined, besides the text just
cited, see Miller v. Sherry, 69 U. S. 237 (1864); Edmeston v. Lyde, 1 Paige Ch.
637 (N. Y. 1829); Smith v. Summerfield, 108 N. C. 284, 12 S. E. 997 (1891);
Scott County National Bank v. Robinson, 143 Tenn. 356, 226 S. W. 218 (1920).
34. See, for example, Miers v. The Zanesville and Maysville Turnpike Co.,
11 Ohio 273 (1842) where the statute involved was construed as giving priority
to the creditor first getting possession through a receiver, regardless of the
order in which bills were filed. Another example is the New York statutory
proceeding which subordinates the creditor's lien from his suit to the rights of
subsequent bona fide purchasers for value. See Comment (1929) 29 COL. L. REV.
504, 511, which raises the question whether the judgment creditor by proceeding
by way of a non-statutory creditor's bill would be protected against such a
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this rule is that enunciated in Michigan, where the courts do not recognize
a lien as existing by virtue of the suit until an injunction is issued or
a receiver is appointed. 35 Elsewhere, the cases indicate with reasonable
clarity that the lien dates from the creation of a lis pendens.
Thus it has been held that a vendee under a sale in a creditor's suit
in which the bill was filed subsequently to a prior bill, took good title
where all the necessary parties were first joined and the description of
the property sold, necessary to create a lis pcndens, was first given in
the second action.36 The situation where the judgment creditor combines
a bill for discovery with a creditor's bill indicates most clearly that no
lien should be recognized until a is pendens is created; for in such a
suit, until the property is discovered it could hardly be said to be in the
custody of the court, or to have been equitably levied upon.3 7 Even under
a statute providing for statutory proceedings in aid of execution and
allowing a lien from the filing of the bill,38 it has been held that the lien
attaches only when the property sought has been described sufficiently
to create a lis pendens as to it. Thus where a bill was filed after an
assignment of a chose in action but before the assignee had perfected
his right by giving notice of the assignment to the obligor, the complain-
ing creditor of the assignor was held not to obtain priority over the as-
signee unless his bill created a lis peneis as to the chose in action.3 0
These cases indicate that there is no lien until a lis ndcns is created.
Indicative of the fact that a lien is then effected are the cases holding
that after a lis pendens is created, death of the debtor will not dissolve
purchaser, inasmuch as the statute does not in terms change the rule as to such
bills.
Query whether in statutory proceedings allowing a lien from the "filing of the
bill," the provision would be construed literally or as suggested supra, note 32.
35. Beith v. Porter, 119 Mich. 365, 78 N. W. 336 (1899) : "Until the debtor
is enjoined from dealing with his property, there is nothing in the law to prevent
any honest disposal of it, and, until a receiver is appointed, there is nothing that
will act on the property itself."
36. Miller v. Sherry, 69 U. S. 237 (1864). The action was by the debtor
whose homestead rights had been preserved in the suit first started, but not in the
later suit in which they had not been asserted, against the vendee under the sale
in the later suit. The court decided for the vendee but indicated that it might
have decided otherwise had the vendee had actual notice of the earlier suit.
Unless the earlier suit was to perfect an existing lien on the property sold, actual
notice should not, however, have changed the result; for, as between competing
judgment creditors without liens, seemingly the one to tale priority is the one
who first bars even bona fide purchasers.
37. Yet, where precision is not required, even in suits of this nature the
courts generally say that the lien dates from the filing of the bill, whether the
bill describes the property in question or not; Edmeston v. Lyde, 1 Paige Ch.
637 (N. Y. 1829); Miers v. The Zanesville and Maysville Turnpike Co., 13 Ohio
197 (1844).
38. See the query, supra note 34, as to the construction of such a provision.
39. Boorum & Peas Co. v. Armstrong, 37 S. W. 1095 (Tenn. Ch. App. 1896).
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the complainant's lien.40  Though the continued existence of the lien is
dependent upon successful termination of the suit 41 it is clear that such
termination is a condition subsequent rather than a condition precedent
to the creation of the lien.42
But as to property subject to legal execution at the instance of the
complaining creditor,43 and also as to shch non-leviable property as to
which lis pendens does not apply,44 the taking of steps sufficient to create
a lis pendens is apparently insufficient of itself to secure to the com-
plainant a lien by virtue of his suit. Generally, the availability of a
remedy by way of legal execution is grounds for dismissal of the bill, if
the objection is timely.4 5 Where the bill is not dismissed and the creditor
is granted a receiver of leviable, as well as non-leviable assets, it has
been suggested that inasmuch as the creditor has thereby obtained more
than that relief to which his strict equitable rights entitle him, the re-
ceivership should be treated as a general or administration receivership,
for the benefit pro rata of all creditors of equal rank as of the commence-
ment of the suit.46 Though the cases do not go to that length,47 some of
the courts passing upon the problem refuse to interfere with legal levies
on property subject to legal execution until the property is actually in
the possession of the cotirt through a receiver.48 The courts vary as to
the exact moment when possession is deemed to have been taken. In some
jurisdictions the lien dates from the order appointing a receiver,40 while
40. Brown v. Nichols, 42 N. Y. 26 (1870). Cf. Beith v, Porter, supra, note 35,
applying the Michigan rule.
41. But see Sage v. Memphis & Little Rock Rr. Co., 125 -1. S. 361 (1888)
where, though the receivership was dissolved, the complainant was given a lien
on rents and profits during its continuance.
42. Metcalf v. Barker, 187 U. S. 165 (1902); Shuck v. Quackenbush, 75 Colo.
592, 227 Pac. 1041 (1924); Corning v. White, 2 Paige Ch. 567 (N. Y. 1831).
43. Where the property is not subject to levy by the complainant, though
it is subject to levy by other creditors, his lien dates from the creation of a li
pendens; Newdigate v. Jacobs, 9 Dana 17 (Ky. 1839).
44. See 2 PomEROY, op. cit. supra note 33, § 636.
45. United Elevator & Grain Co. v. Collier, 188 S. W. 1127 (Mo. App. 1916);
cf. Sage v. Memphis & Little Rock Rr. Co., 125 U, S. 361 (1888).
46. Clark, supra note 2 at 56.
47. See cases cited infra note 48; also Sage v. Memphis & Little Rock Br.
Co., 125 U. S. 361 (1888). Cf. Russell v. Chicago Trust and Savings Bank, 130
Ill. 538, 29 N. E. 37 (1891) and Young v. Clapp, 147 Ill. 176, 32 N. E. 187 (1892)
under statute permitting creditor to pursue all property by way of supple-
mentary proceedings after return nulla .bona. George v. St. Louis Cable &
Western Ry. Co., 44 Fed. 117 (E. D. Mo. 1890) suggests that a creditor's bill
should be held to lie wherever sale under legal execution would not "realize the
full value of the judgment debtor's interest."
48. Davenport v. Kelly, 42 N. Y. 193 (1870); Lansing v. Easton, 7 Paige
Ch. 364 (N. Y. 1839); Battery Park Bank v. Western Carolina Bank, 127 N. C.
432, 37 S. E. 461 (1900). See Comment (1929) 29 CoL. L. Ruv. 504 for the New
York cases.
49. Davenport v. Kelly, 42 N. Y. 193 (1870).
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in at least one jurisdiction it apparently dates from the application for
the appointment of a receiver.50 Whatever the moment at which the
lien is perfected, a judgment creditor acquiring a lien upon leviable assets
by legal process prior to that moment takes in precedence to the creditor
filing the creditor's bill, even though the bill is filed first.5' As between
successive creditor's bills, a superior lien should be accorded the com-
plainant first perfecting his lien against all comers by taking the requisite
steps to secure the appointment of a receiver, regardless of the order in
which Us pendens would have been created. But as against purchasers
with actual notice at least, it is arguable that the lien should date from
an earlier moment.
Where the assets sought are in the custody of the court, either because
of an existing Us pendenzs or a receiver in possession, the liens of creditors
intervening in the same suit are perfected as of the time of intervention.0-
But where a receiver is necessary to perfect the lien or right of the inter-
vening creditor, such lien or right is not perfected until the creditor has
requested that the receivership be extended to his claim, 3 unless the
complaint by its terms includes the intervener among those to share the
benefits of the suit.5 Even though the intervention be in a proceeding
other than a creditor's suit, the cross-bill or answer will entitle the inter-
vening creditor to a lien if his pleadings partake of the charicteristics
of a creditor's bill.5 Where instead of intervention, a separate creditor's
bill is brought the same steps are necessary to acquire a lien as if the
property were not in the custody of the court by'virtue of the prior suit' 0
Ranking of Liens And Rights
Though a lien on specific property of a debtor has been acquired by
virtue of a judgment creditor's suit, such lien may be subordinate in rank
to other legal or equitable liens upon, or rights to, the same property.
In order to ascertain the relative priority of the judgment creditor's lien
it is necessary, then, to rank all claims to the property in descending
order of precedence, thereby determining those claims to which the judg-
ment-creditor's lien is subordinate and those to which it is superior. In
the ease of successive judgment creditor's bills or of successive inter-
ventions or cross-bills in the nature of judgment creditor's bills, all seelkng
the same property, there is ordinarily no reason for ranking the various
liens arising from such proceedings otherwise than chronologically.57
50. See Andrew v. Haag, 245 N. W. 436 (Ia. 1932).
51. Davenport v. Kelly, 42 N. Y. 193 (1870).
52. Wallace's Administrator v. Treakle, 68 Va. 479 (1876).
53. Sage v. Memphis & Little Rock Rr. Co., 125 U. S. 361 (1888).
54. Haehnlen v. Drayton, 192 Fed. 300 (C. C. A. 3rd 1911); Seibert v.
Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry. Co., 52 Minn. 246, 53 N. W. 1151 (1893).
55. Todd v. Todd, 214 Ill. App. 282 (1919); Clark v. Figgins, 31 W. Va.
156, 5 S. E. 643 (1888).
56. Davenport v. Kelly, 42 N. Y. 193 ((1870).
57. Freedman's Savings & Trust Co. v. Earle, 110 U. S. 710 (1884); Jones,
McDowell & Co. v. Arkansas Mechanical and Agricultural Co., 38 Ark. 17 (1881);
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But since all liens and rights do not rank in the chronological order in
which perfected, those entitled to the benefit of a lien accruing from a
judgment creditor's bill are not certain to take precedence over claimants
subsequently perfecting their rights or liens. The real estate mortgage
with pledge of rents and profits as added security affords an example.
While as against other creditors of the mortgagor, the mortgagee would
not have a perfected lien on rents and profits until possession taken 58-
even though he would have a perfected right as against the mortgagor
from the time of demand after default "D - yet most courts agree that once
the mortgagee gets possession through appointment of a receiver or ex-
tension of an existing receivership to include his claim, his right to sub-
sequently accruing rents and profits takes precedence as of the date of
recordation of the mortgage.60 Another example is where certain judg-
ment creditors either with or without levy of execution assert judgment
liens on property which the debtor has fraudulently transferred. With
reference to the particular execution statutes involved, several courts
state that the liens of the judgment creditors date only from the creation
of a lis pendens by suit against the debtor and fraudulent grantee,0 1 but
others declare that since the suits in equity are merely to remove obstruc-
tions, the liens date from the docketing of judgment or the like the same
as if the title had been in the debtor rather than the fraudulent grantee.02
Still other courts combine the two rules in holding that the claims rank
in the order of the legal liens provided those acquiring legal liens have
shown diligence in their perfection. 3
The careful ascertainment of the exact property to which each claim
attaches is as essential to the ranking of competing claims as is the deter-
mination of the moment at which each of the several claims was perfected.
It is clear enough that the lien arising from a creditor's bill is subordinate
to then existing liens on or rights to the specific property covered by the
bill. 4 Apparently, even though the complainant is the first to discover
Russell v. Chicago Trust and Savings Bank, 139 Ill. 538, 29 N. E. 37 (1891)
(statutory proceeding); Todd v. Toad, 214 Ill. App. 282 (1919); Pullis v.
Robinson, 73 Mo. 201 (1880); Hancock v. Wooten, 107 N. C. 9, 12 S. E. 199
(1890); Wallace's Administrator v. Treakle, 68 Va. 479 (1876).
58. Sullivan v. Rosson, 223 N. Y. 217, 119 N. E. 405 (1918).
59. Dow v. Memphis Railroad Co., 124 U. S. 652 (1888).
60. Sullivan v. Rosson, supra note 58 (dictum). See cases cited in 41 C. I.
634, note 88. Conitra: Andrew v. Haag, 245 N. W. 436 (Ia. 1932).
61. Bridgman & Co. v. McKissick and Bone, 15 Iowa 260 (1863). See also,
Union National Bank v. Lane, 177 Ill. 171, 52 N. E. 361 (1898); Rapploye v.
International Bank, 93 Ill. 396 (1879).
62. Hillyer v. LeRoy, 179 N. Y. 369, 72 N. E. 237 (1904) ; Foley v. Ruley, 50
W. Va. 158, 40 S. E. 382 (1901).
63. This seems to be the rule in New Jersey. See Dey v. Allen, 78 Atl. 674
(N. J. Eq. 1910); Sitley & Son v. Morris, 67 Atl. 789 Atl. (N. J. Eq. 1907);
and Kinmouth v. White, 61 N. J. Eq. 358, 48 Atl. 952 (1901).
64. McCormick v. Puritan Coal Mining Co., 28 F. (2d) 33 1 (C. C. A. 3d,
1928); McClurg v. McSpadden, 101 Tenn. 433, 47 S. W. 698 (1898). In fact,
in certain instances, where the outstanding lien is for the benefit of all creditors
[Vol. 42
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that a ranking claim is voidable, he does not thereby step into the position
of the claim displaced. Instead valid liens on the specific property per-
fected after the voidable claim but before the complainant's lien still rank
ahead of his. Seemingly this is so even though it is the complainant
who has borne the onus of invalidating the voidable claim-65 It sometimes
:happens, however, that though prior liens have attached to certain property
in a specific res, a judgment creditor's lien is the first to attach to
other property in the same res.66 In such a case, as to that property to
which his lien is the first to attach, the complaining creditor takes priority
over all others. Thus, though judgment liens have already attached to
a mortgagor's equity of redemption, a junior judgment creditor first dis-
covering that the mortgagee is not a holder for value and perfecting a
lien on his record interest in the property has been held to have a ranking
lien to the extent of that interest.
6 7
Those Entitled to the Benefit of the Lien Ailsing from a
Judgment Creditor's Suit
The various claims to the same specific property having been ranked
in order of priority and the rank of the lien arising from a particular
judgment creditor's bill having been ascertained, the only question reman-
ing is as to the number and identity of the creditors entitled to claim the
benefits of the particular lien arising from the billy8 The cases where
a complainant may not, because of the want of a judgment and the non-
recognition of "equitable attachment," claim a lien for himself alone, have
already been discussed. Where the bill is allowed to stand, even though
it contains a prayer for relief for the benefit of the complainant alone,
ratably, a judgment creditor's bill will not even be allowed to lie; Beith v. Porter,
119 Mich. 365, 78 N. W. 336 (1899). But this is not true as to property not
affected by the lien or included in a trust for the benefit of all; Cole v. Marple,
98 Ill. 58 (1881); Pullis v. Robinson, 73 Mo. 201 (1880); George v. William-
son, 26 Mo. 190 (1858).
65. Lopez v. Campbell, 163 N. Y. 340, 57 N. E. 501 (1900), reversing 18 App.
Div. 427, 46 N. Y. S. 91 (4th Dep't 1897). See Roseboom v. Whittaker, 132 Ill.
:81 (1890) and Merchants' National Bank v. McDonald, 63 Neb. 303, 88 N. W.
492 (1901).
66. In analyzing such a case it is essential to think of "property" in the legal
sense of legal relations rather than in the vulgar sense of the physical thing
itself.
67. Rappleye v. International Bank, 93 Ill. 396 (1879).
68. It is necessary to bear in mind that where successive interventions are
permitted in a creditor's suit, except as to those interveners entitled to share
the complainant's lien, each separate intervention creates a new and separate
lien. Where a judgment creditor intervenes in a non-judgment creditor's suit,
the former's lien may take priority over the latter's; Merchants' National Bank
v. McDonald, 63 Neb. 363, 88 N. W. 492 (1901).
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the lien' resulting therefrom is held to be for.the benefit of all who inter-
vene in time.69
Originally, it was not entirely clear that even a judgment creditor with
execution returned unsatisfied could sue for himself alone if there were
other creditors in like circumstances,1 0 but any doubts on this point were
soon dispelled. 71 Yet it is not an uncommon practice for even judgment-
creditor complainants to make the benefits of their suit available to other
creditors. In such cases, the determination of those who may claim under
the original petition and who need not perfect a separate lien for them-
selves is a matter of construing th4 language of the petition for relief.
Where the language is not clear, the courts are generally torn between
a desire to effect ratable distribution so far as is possible and a desire
to give to those bearing the risks of the litigation a reward for their
diligence. Where the facts are such that a petition for a general or
administration receivership will lie in the particular jurisdiction, broad
language such, as a statement that the petition is on behalf of the com-
plainant and all other creditors will be held to amount to a prayer for
a general receivership, fixing the rights of all claimants at the commence-
ment of the suit, even though the complainant is a judgment creditor.12
But where the courts of the particular jurisdiction would not allow a
general receivership undek the facts of the case, similar language is held
to amount to a prayer for relief only for those entitled thereto, with the
result that intervening judgment creditors as a class take prior to the
intervening general creditors. 73
Where the bill is for the benefit of all judgment creditors or of all who
might wish to join, the courts are generally troubled as to how late in the
proceedings a judgment creditor may join and still share ratably with
the others. Such language is sometimes construed to require intervention
before appropriation of the property sought to satisfaction of claims
against the debtor,7 4 and is sometimes construed to permit intervention
at any time before final distribution.7 Where there is no specific declara-
tion as to those for whom relief is sought, it has been held that the original
lien should be for the benefit of the complainants alone, thereby according
them priority.70 While the results in these cases might seem uncertain,
the complaining creditor can, by the use of clear and unequivocal language,
eliminate uncertainty, for the reason that his right to keep for himself
69. Day v. Washburn, 24 How. 352 (U. S. 1860).
70. Note the reservations of Kent, C., in the opinion in Hendricks v. Robinson,
2 Johns. Ch. 283 (N. Y. 1816).
71. Elmore v. Spear, 27 Ga. 193 (1859); Corning v. White, 2 Paige Ch. 567
(N. Y. 1831); Edmeston v. Lyde, 1 Paige Ch. 637 (N. Y. 1829); M'Durmutt v.
Strong, 4 Johns. Ch. 687 (N. Y. 1820).
72. Haehnlen v. Drayton, 192 Fed. 300 (C. C. A. 3d, 1911).
73. Merchants' National Bank v. McDonald, 63 Neb. 363, 88 N. W. 492 (1901).
74. Senter v. Williams, 61 Ark. 189, 32 S. W. 490 (1895).
75. George v. St. Louis Cable & Western Ry. Co., 44 Fed. 117 (E. D. Mo.
1890); Jones v. Davenport, 46 N. J. Eq. 237, 19 Atl. 22 (1890).
76. Clark v. Figgins, 31 W. Va. 156, 5 S. E. 643 (1888) (semble).
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the benefits of his suit gives him the power to designate those intended
to share and to exclude all others.
77
RIGHTS OF DEPOSITORS AND BORROWERS UPON INSOLVENCY
OF BUILDING AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS
IN determining the rights of depositors in and borrowers from building
and loan associations, courts have proceeded on the theory that these
"members", as well as the holders of "full-paid" and "guarantee" stock in
the association, are owners of the business and must share in its losses.
While such a theory was doubtless justified in the case of early associations,
its validity now is subject to serious question. A building and loan asso-
ciation still acknowledges the receipt of deposits by issuing shares of
"instalment" stock to its depositors, and the depositors contract to 'ma-
ture" this stock by making regular payments of "dues" until, with the
addition of dividends by the association, their deposits equal the stock's
face value.1 And borrowers contract with building and loan associations
to repay their loans by taking and paying dues upon stock the value of
which at maturity will equal the amount borrowed, the matured stock to
be set off against and to cancel the loan.-2 The view that the purchases
of stock contemplated by these contracts may be merely a formal com-
pliance with the only terms upon which building and loan associations
will receive deposits and make loans, seems never to have been considered
by the courts. Instead, the contracts have been enforced literally, and
rules of law applicable only to building and loan associations evolved with
more apparent regard for logic and consistency with premises than for
equitable results.
Since the moneys with which a building and loan association carries
on its business are, upon the theory of the courts, received from and
owed to 3 its stockholders, the insolvency of these institutions is aid
77. Thus where permission to intervene is given over the complainant's ob-
jection, the intervener does not share the complainant's lien; Hancock v. Wooten,
107 N. C. 9, 12 S. E. 199 (1890). But see Talcott v. Grant Wire & Spring Co.,
131 fI1. 248, 23 N. E. 403 (1890) where the decision was contra because of
breach of faith by the complainant.
1. The association obligates itself to refund the depositor's money when
his stock is thus matured.
2. The loan is thus an "advance" of the maturity value of the stock which
the borrower contracts to purchase. For this advance the borrower pays
interest, and frequently an additional bonus or "premium" for having been
granted the loan ahead of others seeking to borrow the same funds from the
association. Borrowing members receive the same dividends that are paid to
other holders of an association's stock.
3. Holders of an association's instalment stock who have not pledged their
stock as security for loans from the association, and holders of full-paid stock,
may secure their money at any time by giving notice a stated time (frequently
thirty days) in advance. Associations are usually not required to devote
more than half their receipts at any one time to the payment of withdrawals;
if this does not suffice to meet the demands of all withdrawing members, thoze
whose notices matured first are paid in full and the others must wait their
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generis. A building and loan association is "insolvent" when its assets
have depreciated to a value less than the amount which the association
has already received from members as payments for their stock. 4 Further
payments of dues to such an association thus insolvent will only increase
the association's capital obligation, without Affecting the value of the pay-
ments already received. Nothing is to be gained, therefore, by continuing
the existence of an insolvent association, and dissolution must be under-
taken. The dissolution may ordinarily be accomplished by voluntary
liquidati6n,5 or an assignment for the benefit of creditors,"' or by a mem-
ber's petition for the appointment of a receiver.7 A few states have
given the power to petition for a receiver's appointment exclusively to
the state's supervisor of building and loan associations, or to the attorney
general acting upon the advice of the supervising official; 8 and in some
jurisdictions the supervising official himself, or his appointee, is directed
to proceed as statutory liquidator of an insolvent association, without
recourse to the courts.0 Congress at its last session exempted building
and loan associations from the operation of the bankruptcy law. 10
turn in the next payment. But legislatures in three states have recently
provided for pro rata payments of the withdrawal demands upon an association
when all cannot be paid in full. CAL. GEN. LAws (Deering, 1931) tit. 76, §
6.01; FLA. CoMP. LAws (Skillman, Gum. Supp. 1932) § 6183; Mo. STAT. ANN.
(1932) c. 35, § 5604.
4. Towle v. American Building, Loan and Investment Society, 61 Fed. 446
(C. C. N. D. Ill. 1894); Lewis v. Clark, 129 Fed. 570 (C. C. A. 9th, 1904);
Gunby v. Armstrong, 133 Fed. 417 (C. C. A. 5th, 1904); Bottle v. Republic
Savings and Loan Association, 63 N. J. Eq. 578, 53 Atl. 11 (1902); Rogers v.
Hargo, 92 Tenn. 35, 20 S. W. 430 (1892). Contra: Sjoberg v. Security Savings
and Loan Association, 73 Minn. 203, 75 N. W. 1116 (1898). Cf. Note (1933)
81 U. OF PA L. REv. 449.
The Florida legislature, though it requires immediate liquidation by an
association whose "doubtful" assets are more than 20%, of its total assets,
declares that an association shall be deemed insolvent only when its assets
are insufficient to meet its indebtedness to outside creditors. FLA. Coip. LAws
(Skillman, Cum. Supp. 1932) § 6183; cf. ORE. LAwS (1931) C. 373. § 56, 57;
VA. ACTS (1932) c. 102, § 17.
5. Most states now provide by statute for voluntary liquidation. For
example, see MICH. Comup. LAWS (1929) § 12159; MINN. STAT. (Mason, Supp.
1931) § 7770-1; TEx. LAws (1931) c. 198, § 1; VA. ACTS (1932) c. 102, § 23.
6. Globe Building and Loan Co. v. Wood, 110 Ky. 4, 60 S. W. 858 (1901);
Woerheide v. Johnston, 81 Mo. App. 193 (1899); Layton v. Hough, 169 Mo.
App. 213, 152 S. W. 410 (1912); Christian's Appeal, 102 Pa. 184 (1883).
7. See ENDLICH, LAW OF BUILDING ASSOCIATIONS (2d ed. 1895) 500; SuND
HEIm, LAW OF BUILDING AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS (3d ed. 1933) 202.
8. Union Savings and Investment Co. v. Salt Lake County, 44 Utah 397,
140 Pac. 221 (1914); see ALA. GEN. ACTS (1931) no. 159, § 17; ARE. ACTS
(1931) no. 236, § 11; ILL. REv. STAT. (Smith-Hurd, 1931) c. 32, § 243; VA.
ACTS (1932) c. 102, § 17.
9. CAL. GEN. LAWS (Deering, 1931) tit. 76, § 13.11ff; FLA. CoiP. LAWS
(Skillman, Cum. Supp. 1932) § 6183 (4); ORE. LAwS (1931) c. 373, § 56, 57;
Wis. STAT. (1931) § 215.33.
10. Session Laws (1st Session, 72d. Congress, 1932) c. 38, p. 47.
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In directing the dissolution of insolvent building and loan associations,
the courts have declared that an association's insolvency rescinds its
contracts with members.1 Neither borrowers nor non-borrowers are fur-
ther obligated for the payment of dues; 12 and, what is more important,
the agreement that the borrower's loan shall be repaid gradually by the
maturing of his stock is said to be abrogated and the loan becomes due
immediately.13 In repaying his loan thus prematurely the borrower in
most jurisdictions is not entitled to set off against his indebtedness the
sums he has paid as dues, but must repay the original amount of his
advance and await the final distribution of dividends for credit for his
stock payments.' 4 A set-off, if granted at this time, would credit the
11. Lewis v. Clark, supra note 4; Cook v. Emmet Perpetual and Mutual
Building Association, 90 Md. 284, 44 Atl. 1022 (1899); Knutson v. Northwestern
Loan and Building Association, 67 Blinn. 201, 69 N. W. 889 (1897); People's
Building and Loan Association v. McPhilamy, 81 Miss. 61, 32 So. 1001 (1902);
Buist v. Bryan, 44 S. C. 121, 21 S. E. 537 (1895); Young v. Improvement Loan
and Building Association, 48 W. Va. 512, 38 S. E. 670 (1900).
12. Low Street Building Association v. Zucker, 48 Md. 448 (1878); Peter's
Building Association v. Jaecksch, 51 Md. 198 (1879); "Buist v. Bryan, -upra
note 11; Leahy v. National Building and Loan Association, 100 Wis. 555, 76
N. W. 625 (1898).
13. Lewis v. Clark, supra note 4; Gunby v. Armstrong, supra note 4; Curtis
v. Granite State Provident Association, 69 Conn. 6, 36 Atl. 1023 (1897); Woer-
heide v. Johnston, supra note 6; Strohen v. Franklin Saving Fund and Loan
Association, 115 Pa. 273, 8 At]. 843, (1887); Leahy v. National Building and
Loan Association, supra note 12. Contra: Armstrong v. United States Build-
ing and Loan Association, 15 App. D. C. 1 (1899).
The statute of limitations begins to run on the loans from the declaration of
insolvency. Clarke v. Caufman, 66 Kan. 61, 71 Pac. 241 (1903); Graves v.
Seifried, 31 Utah 203, 87 Pac. 674 (1906).
14. This is called the Pennsylvania rule. The borrower must repay the
sum he actually received, plus interest at the statutory rate. He is, however,
relieved of his promise to pay a premium, and so is allowed to set off his
payments upon premium as well as upon interest. Bowman v. Foster and Logan
Hardware Co., 94 Fed. 592 (C. C. W. D. Ark. 1899); Coltrane v. Blake, 113
Fed. 785 (C. C. A. 4th, 1902); Groover v. Pacific Coast Savings Society, 104
Cal. 67, 127 Pac. 495 (1912); Curtis v. Granite State Provident Association,
supra note 13; Mutual Loan Association v. Tyre, 3 Boyce 88, 81 AtI. 48 (Del.
1911) ; Ottensoser v. Scott, 47 Fla. 276, 37 So. 161 (1904); Marion Trust Co.
v. Trustees of Edwards Lodge, I. 0. 0. F., 153 Ind. 96, 54 N. E. 444 (1899);
Rogers v. Rains, 100 Ky. 295, 38 S. W. 483 (1896); Smith v. Bath Loan and
Building Association, 126 Me. 59, 136 AtI. 284 (1927); Knutson v. Northwestern
Loan and Building Association, sztpra note 11; People's Building and Loan
Association v. McPhilamy, supra note 11; Brown v. Archer, 62 Mo. App. 277
(1895); Amselme v. American Savings and Loan Association, 63 Neb. 525, 88
N. W. 665 (1902); Saunders v. State Savings and Loan Association, 121 Neb.
473, 237 N. W. 572 (1931); Weir 'v. Granite State Provident Association, 56
N. J. Eq. 234, 38 Atl. 643 (1897); Bank Commissioners v. Granite State
Provident Association, 68 N. H. 554, 44 At. 605 (1896); People v. New York
Building Loan Banking Co., 45 Misc. 4, 90 N. Y. Supp. 809 (Sup. Ct. 1904);
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borrower with the nominal rather than with the depreciated value of his
stock payments, and so would relieve him of any share in the association's
losses.
It seems inequitable and inconsistent with usual theories of contract that
the insolvency of the creditor association should thus force the debtor to
repay his loan before the date specified in his contract, and should also
deprive him of a set-off of prior payments such as he would have been
entitled to at the stock's maturity. But the courts, citing equity's principle
of equality, declare that the borrower may not liquidate his indebtedness
-by continuing his purchase of stock, since that would prolong the dis-
solution proceedings indefinitely; nor, in repaying his loan prematurely,
may the borrower have a set-off, because having participated in the
association's profits as a member he must also share the burdens of its
failure. Neither of these arguments is sound. Both are founded on the
premise that the borrower in purchasing his stock became one of the
owners of the enterprise. But it does not seem probable that this was
the intention of the building, and loan association in selling, or of the
borrower in buying his stock. The proposition made by the association
was to lend money; the concern of the borrower was with the terms upon
which he could secure a loan-not with the merits of the corporation's
instalment stock as an investment. Nor can it be said that the sums
with which the borrower has been credited as "dividends" on his stock
characterize him irrevocably as a member and owner of the association;
they simply complicate the calculation of what he actually pays as interest
Earnhardt v. Brown, 197 N. C. 204, 148 S. E. 25 (1929); Hale v. Cairns, 8
N. D. 145, 77 N. W. 1010 (1898); Bayless v. Baird, 110 Ohio St. 305, 143 N. E.
703 (1924); Strohen v. Franklin Saving Fund and Loan Association, supra
note 13; Rogers v. Hargo, supra note 4; Post v. Mechanics' Building and Loan
Association, 97 Tenn. 408, 37 S. W. 216 (1896); Young v. Improvement Loan
and Building Association, supra note 11.
What is known as the Illinois rule differs from the Pennsylvania rule only
in that the borrower is relieved of only part of the premium he promised to
pay. He is charged with, and so not allowed to set off, a portion of the premium
equal to the proportion the time which the loan had already run (when the
association's insolvency made it then due) bears to the total intended duration
of the loan. The theory of this rule is that the consideration for the premium
is the method of repaying it by instalments; hence upon insolvency the asso-
ciation may charge the borrower with so much of the premium as was earned
when the loan became prematurely due. Towle v. American Building, Loan
and Investment Society, supra note 4; Miles v. New South Building and Loan
Association, 111 Fed. 946 (C. C. E. D. La. 1900); Gwinn v. Iron Belt Building
and Loan Association, 132 Fed. 710 (C. C. W. D. Va. 1904); Choisser v. Young,
69 Ill. App. 252 (1896); Couch v. Lake Shore Building Loan and Homestead
Association, 200 Ill. App. 56 (1916); Monier v. Clark, 12 N. M. 118, 75 Pac. 35
(1904).
Iowa and New York now provide by statute that the actual or depreciated
value of the borrower's stock is to be estimated and set off against his indebted-
ness when insolvency makes his loan prematurely due. IowA CODE (1931) §
9365; N. Y. BANKING LAW (1930) § 402.
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and premium on his loan. The membership of borrowers in building and
loan associations is more fiction than fact.
The courts of a few states, apparently recognizing that a borrower
from a building and loan association does not intend to become an entre-
preneur in it, although they require that he repay his loan immediately
upon the association's insolvency, permit him to set off all his previous
payments to it on the ground that he is 7zot a member but merely a debtor
of the association.' 5 His agreement to purchase stock is said not to be
a separate contract, but a part of his loan contract; the payments of dues
thus go not to a stock or membership account, but directly to liquidation of
the loan. The set-off which these courts grant seems equitable if accelera-
tion of the loan is insisted upon. But this acceleration can be justified only
on the ground that the borrower is a member of the association, against
whom the rule of equal treatment may be invoked; it is therefore incon-
sistent with the reasoning upon which the same courts grant a set-off. A
more equitable rule, based on recognition that the borrower's contract is that
of a debtor and not of a member, would permit repayment of the loan by
instalments to be continued after the association's insolvency, and would
grant the set-off provided for in the contract when the debt was repaid. 0
In distributing the assets of insolvent building and loan associations,
it is not questioned that the claims of general or outside creditors are to
be preferred over those of members.' 7 The principal controversies have
15. This is known as the Maryland rule. Coltrane v. Baltimore Building and
Loan Association, 110 Fed. 293 (C. C. D. Md. 1901); Lacefield v. Taylor, 48 S. W.
(2d) 832 (Ark. 1932); Butson v. Home Savings and Trust Co., 129 Iowa 370,
105 N. W. 645 (1906); Low Street Building Association v. Zucker; Peter's
Building Association v. Jaecksch; Buist v. Bryan, all supra note 12; Fidelity
Building and Loan Association v. Thompson, 45 S. W. (2d) 167 (Tex. 1932);r
Hale v. Stenger, 22 Wash. 516, 61 Pac. 156 (1900). The Pennsylvania, Illinois
and Maryland rules are stated in Note (1927) 11 MiN.N. L. Rsv. 655, and Note
(1929) 77 U. oF PA. L. Rnv. 534; see especially Note (1933) 81 U. OF PA. L.
REv. 449.
The Maryland rule has been adopted by statute recently in three states.
ARK. AcTs (1931) no. 236, § 7; TEx. LAws (1930) c. 51, § 1; Wis. LAWs (Sp.
Session 1931) c. 23, § 3.
16. The court so held in Armstrong v. United States Building and Loan
Association, supra note 13.
Repayment according to the contract's terms would delay a final distribution
of assets, unless the loans could be sold to other associations or to some agency
such as the Federal Home Loan Bank; and this would entail the e.pense of a
prolonged receivership (or other liquidation proceedings). But this expense
-would probably be more than met by the interest and premiums which borrowers
would continue to pay.
17. This assumption is implicit in the decision of almost every case dealing
with an insolvent building and loan association. Solomons v. American Building
and Loan Association, 116 Fed. 676 (C. C. N. D. Ga. 1902); Cook v. Emmet
Perpetual and Mutual Association, supra note 11; Criswell's Appeal, 100 Pa.
488 (1882); Stone v. New Schiller Building and Loan Association, 302 Pa. 544,
153 Ati. 758 (1931).
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involved the attempts of different classes of stockholders, and of those
having taken steps to withdraw their funds, to secure priority over the
other stockholders by classing themselves as creditors. Most important
in this connection is the determination of the rights, relative to each
other, of the non-borrowing holders of instalment stock and the full-paid
stockholders. The courts, recurring to their basic thesis that all members
of a building and loan association are stockholders who have agreed to
share its losses, have uniformly held that these two groups of members
have equal rights in the association, and have refused to prefer either.
If the fact that instalment stock is paid for gradually, over a long
time, while full-paid stock is bought with a single lump-sum payment,'"
were the only distinction between these two groups of members, the equal
treatment of them insisted upon by the courts would seem just and proper.
But it seems reasonable to believe that beyond this distinction lies a
difference in the class of investors attracted by the two methods of pay-
ment, and a difference in the contracts they desire to make. The terms
upon which instalment stock is sold, calling for payment to the building
and loan associations of a small sum each week and obligating the asso-
ciations to permit withdrawals at any time upon the giving of proper
notice, alone suggest that the funds thus secured are those of a com-
nunity's savings depositors-typically, persons with moderate incomes,
able to save only in small amounts, and whose small savings constitut,
their only financial reserves. This suggestion becomes more persuasive
when it is discovered that in endeavoring to "sell" this "stock" building
and loan associations advertise not the merits of the stock itself but the
virtues of systematic saving 19 and the wisdom of placing savings with
the associations. Finally, it is to be observed that instalment stock is
issued not in the form of an ordinary stock certificate but as a pass book,
indistinguishable from that given a savings bank depositor. In view of
these circumstances, it may well be argued that the courts should disregard
the terminology of the contracts of instalment stockholders, and recognize
that these members are in fact depositors, intending to make a temporary
and safe loan of their savings rather than to purchase with them a re-
deemable share of stock of uncertain value. It is not likely that instalment
stockholders ordinarily make personal use of the right to vote which their
contracts give them.
Purchasers of full-paid stock, on the other hand, have none of the indicia
of savings depositors. There are no circumstances suggesting that these
members come for the most part from the lower income groups, or that
the money which they place with a building; and loan association is a
primary reserve; instead, it would seem likely that their purchase of
18. Full-paid stock is paid for either at its face value, to draw dividends
at a fixed rate, or at perhaps half its face value, to be matured by accumulating
,dividends.
19. As one association has expressed it, compulsory regular saving is "at
first a duty, then becomes a habit and soon a pleasure-the saving habit is the
true road to success and happiness."
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stock is made with funds withdrawn from savings elsewhere deposited.
By purchasing building and loan association stock, full-paid members
admittedly demonstrate a desire for a safe investment; but it is the security
of a conservative rather than a speculative stock purchase which they
seek, not the standing of a depositor or creditor.
In the light of this reasoning, it seems strange that the attempts to
break down the courts' rule of equal treatment have been made not by the
instalment stockholders but by the full-paid members. The explanation
of this phenomenon apparently lies in the fact that when this rule of
equality was being evolved the relation of the holders of the orthodox
instalment stock to the association's general or outside creditors was well
established, while the status of the newer full-paid stock was yet to be
determined. Certainly the courts rightly decided 20 that the full-paid
members were not creditors of the association and were not entitled to
any preference over holders of the other classes of stock. And although
treating the non-borrowing instalment members of an insolvent building
and loan association as its creditors would have the disadvantage of
prejudicing the standings of the full-paid stockholders, the advantage of
giving protection to the savings of persons so closely resembling depositors
might well lead the courts to break in the other direction from the equal
treatment of the associations' members to which they have heretofore
adhered.
A few building and loan associations create a third class of members
by issuing "guarantee" or "reserve-fund" stock. 2' This stock is issued
to a small group of members, usually those organizing the enterprise; the
funds secured from it are used for meeting the association's operating
expenses and for the creation of a reserve with which to guarantee
dividends, paid at a fixed rate in this type of association, upon the
instalment and full-paid stock. When such an association becomes in-
solvent, it is clear that the claims of the holders of the guarantee stock
must be deferred until those of all other persons from whom the asso-
ciation has received money have been met; and the courts have so held.=
20. Towle v. American Building and Loan Association, 75 Fed. 938 (C. C. N. D.
Ill. 1896); Coltrane v. Baltimore Building and Loan Association, 110 Fed. 281
(C. C. D. Md. 1901); Coltrane v. Blake, supra note 14; Solomons v. American
Building and Loan Association, svpra note 17; Gibson v. Safety Homestead
and Loan Association, 170 Ill. 44, 48 N. E. 580 (1897); Teller v. Wilcoxen, 110
Iowa 565, 81 N. W. 772 (1900); Forwood v. Eubank, 106 Ky. 291, 50 S. W. 255
(1899); Steinberger v. Independent Loan and Savings Association, 84 Md.
625, 36 Atl. 439 (1897); Fitzgerald v. State Mutual Building and Loan Asso-
ciation, 76 N. J. Eq. 137, 79 Atl. 454 (1909). Contra: It re National Building
Loan and Provident Association, 12 Del. Ch. 93, 107 At. 453 (1919); Cashen v.
Southern Mutual Building and Loan Association, 114 Ga. 983, 41 S. E. 51
(1902).
21. This stock is not typical of building and loan associations, and is not in
general use. Some states do not authorize it issuance; for example, cf. CoNx.
GEN. STAT. (1930) c. 210; ILL. REV. STAT. (Smith-Hurd, 1930) C. 32, §§ 213-257.
22. Watkins v. Commonwealth Savings and Loan Association, 71 N. J. Eq. 711,
64 At. 751 (1906); People v. New York Building-Loan Banking Co., 119
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A recent California statute imposes on the holders of building and loan
association guaranty stock double liability similar to that of holders of
bank stock. 23
After the relative standings of the holders of instalment, full-paid and
guarantee stock in an insolvent building and loan association have been
determined, the further question arises as to the effect of a matured with-
drawal notice, and of the maturity of instalment stock, upon the standing
of a member. Preference is claimed by non-borrowing holders of instal-
ment stock and by full-paid stockholders whose withdrawal notices matured
(became idue for payment) before the association was declared insolvent.
The courts have held that if the association was in fact solvent when the
unpaid notice matured, its holder is to be preferred in the distribution of
assets when insolvency later occurs.24 But a notice maturing after a
condition of insolvency has arisen will not, even though the insolvency is
then unknown, entitle a member to any preference. 25 Even should suit
be brought on a matured but unpaid withdrawal notice and a judgment
be secured against an insolvent association while it is still a going concern,
no preference will result.26 However, it appears that an association's
promissory note or other written acknowledgement of unconditional in-
debtedness, even though given a withdrawing member after actual in-
App. Div. 830, 104 N. Y. Supp. 892 (1st Dep't 1907), aff'd, 189 N. Y. 547, 82
N. E. 1131; cf. People v. New York Building-Loan Banking Co., 41 lisc. 363,
84 N. Y. Supp. 844 (Sup. Ct. 1903). CAL. GEN. LAws (Deering, 1931) tit. 76,
§ 7.01. ORE. LAws (1931) c. 373, § 60.
23. CAL. GEN. LAWS (Deering, 1931) tit. 76, § 7.01.
24. Wise Brothers v. 'Yazoo Building and Loan Association, 105 Bliss. 78,
62 So. 1 (1913); State v. Active Building and Loan Association, 80 Md. AV.
585 (1899); see Pacific Coast Savings Society v. Sturdevant, 165 Cal. 687,
694, 133 Pac. 485, 488 (;L913); Bohn v. Boone Building and Loan Association,
135 Iowa 140, 145, 112 N. W. 199, 201 (1907); Christian's Appeal, supra note 6,
at 189. Contra: Vinton v. National Building and Loan Association, 23 Ky.
L. R. 2021 (1902).
25. Coltrane v. Baltimore Building and Loan Association, 110 Fed. 272
(C. C. D. Md. 1901); Aldrich v. Gray, 147 Fed. 453 (C. 0. A. 6th, 1906);
Walker v. Terry, 138 Ala. 428, 35 So. 466 (1903); Pacific Coast Savings
Society v. Sturdevant, supra note 24; Chapman v. Young, 65 Ill. App. 131
(1895); Gibson v. Safety Homestead and Loan Association, supra note 20;
Reitz v. Hayward, 100 Mo. App. 216, 73 S. W, 374 (1903); Fitzgerald v. State
Mutual Building and Loan Association, supra note 20; Coggeshall v. McGrath,
89 N. Y. Supp. 334 (Sup. Ct., 1903); Christian's Appeal, supra note 6; In ro
National Savings, Loan, and Building Association, 9 Wkly. Case Notes 79
(Pa. 1880).
26. Chapman v. Young, supra note 25; Musial v. Kosciuszko Building and
Loan Association, 80 Ill. App. 464 (1898); Manheimer v. Henderson Building
and Loan Association, 24 Ky. L. R. 1816 (1903); Stone v. New Schiller Building
and Loan Association, supra note 17; cf. N. J. STAT. SERVICE (1932) § 27-R
(52); ORE. LAWS (1931) C. 373, § 52. Contra: Bories v. Union Building and
Loan Association, 141 Cal. 74, 74 Pac. 552 (1903) ; In re National Building Loan
and Provident Association, supra note 20.
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solvency has arisen, will entitle him to stand as a creditor in the dis-
tribution of assets.2
7
If the non-borrowing instalment stockholders were, as has been sug-
gested, regarded as depositors having the status of creditors even without
having sought to withdraw, their withdrawal notices, no matter when
given, clearly should not benefit their standing in the distribution of
assets; no equity would be served by placing their claims ahead of non-
withdrawing depositors and of the outside creditors. More difficult
problems, however, are raised by the withdrawal notices of the full-paid
members, and of the "depositors" if they too are to be regarded as
stockholders. The preference accorded these members when their unpaid
notices matured before the association became insolvent is consistent with
their contracts, and may be justified upon that ground alone. Equally
clear is the justice of the courts' refusal to give effect to notices maturing
after the association has been adjudged insolvent and dissolution pro-
ceedings started; the claims as they stood upon the cessation of business
should form the basis for the distribution of assets. But less can be said
in support of the refusal to prefer the claims of members holding unpaid
withdrawal notices which matured after a condition of actual insolvency
arose but before it was known or declared. This refusal is founded upon
the court's constantly repeated doctrine that all of a building and loan
association's members have purchased stock upon the same terms and so
must be treated equally. But there is no equity in the equality which
denies a preference to members who conclude they cannot afford to leave
their funds in an association of doubtful solvency and who have there-
fore complied with the requirements of their contracts for withdrawing.
The English courts in giving a preference to such members-S appear to
have reached a more equitable solution of the problem.
A preference in the distribution of assets of an insolvent building and
loan association has frequently been sought by instalment members wa,
having paid their dues for the period agreed upon, have matured their
stock. Like those holding matured withdrawal notices, these members
have acquired the right to immediate repayment of their investments by
performing the requirements of their contracts. The same considerations
27. Solomons v. American Building and Loan Association, ctipra note 17
("script"); Rickert v. Suddard, 184 Ill. 149, 56 N. E. 344 (1900) (check
drawn by association; held to transfer title to funds in bank); Bohn v. Boone
Building and Loan Association, supra note 24 (promissory note); State v.
Active Building and Loan Association, supra note 24 (promissory notes);
Conolly v. Practical Building and Loan Association, G Wld-y. Case Notes 176
(Pa. 1878) (order on association's treasury). Contra: Fort Smith Building
Association v. Cohn, 75 Ark. 497, 87 S. W. 1172 (1905) (promissory notes);
Colin v. Wellford, 102 Va. 581, 46 S. E. 780 (1904) (promissory notes).
28. For statements of the English Rule see 3 HALsBunY, LAws oF ENGLUm
(2d ed. 1931) § 762, 765; DAvis, LAW RELATING To BUILDING SOCinnrs (5th
ed. 1931) 167 ff. For a concise statement of the American rules governing the




therefore govern the standings of both groups of claimants, and the same
rules should apply. The courts have so held.
29
Occasionally, either through fraud or through an honest mistake of
fact, a building and loan association pays a dividend when no profits
have been earned,30 or pays a withdrawal notice from funds not properly
available for that purpose. 31 Some courts allow such payments to be
recovered, or to be credited as advances on the final distribution of assets
when insolvency later occurs.32 Since these payments are not within the
agreements of the parties, such recovery seems justified.33
In a few cases building and loan associations have received ordinary
deposits, guaranteeing a fixed rate of interest upon them and issuing no
stock shares for them.3 4 Other associations have borrowed money by
issuing interest-bearing debentures. 35 That these depositors, and holders
of such debentures, are creditors of the associations, is clear.30 Also, when
an association has deposited security for the protection of any investor,
such an investor is entitled to the benefit of that security upon the asso-
ciation's insolvency.3
7
The unique organization of building and loan associations, and par-
ticularly their issuance of instalment stock, was designed to serve the
function for which these associations were originally formed. Early
building and loan associations38 were small institutions organized to
29. Pacific Coast Savings Society v. Sturdevant, supra note 24; Wise Brothers
-v. Yazoo Building and Loan Association, supra note 24; In re National Savings,
Loan, and Building Association, supra note 25; Criswell's Appeal, supra note
17; Rogers v. Ogden Building and Savings Association, 30 Utah 188, 83 Pac.
'754 (1905); see McKee v. Home Savings and Trust Co., 133 Iowa 548, 549,
110 N. W. 908, (1907).
30. Bingham v. Marion Trust Co., 27 Ind. App. 247, 61 N. E. 29 (1901);
Kurtz v. Bubeck, 39 Pa. Super. Ct. 370 (1909).
31. Aldrich v. Gray, supra note 25.
32. See cases notes 30 and 31, supra.
33. But ef. Coltrane v. Baltimore Building and Loan Association, supra note
20; McKee v. Home Savings and Trust Co., supra note 29; Young v. Stevenson,
180 Ill. 608, 54 N. E. 562 (1899).
34. Brennan v. Gallagher, 199 Ill. 207, 65 N. E. 227 (1902); Criswoll's
Appeal, supra note 17; Blunt v. Mercantile Railway Building and Loan Asso-
ciation, 115 Va. 6, 78 S. E. 554 (1913).
35. State v. Phoenix Loan Association, 86 Mo. App. 301 (1900); Mott v.
Guardian Building and Loan Association, 14 Pac. (2d) 447 (Ore. 1932).
36. And the courts have so held. See cases notes 34 and 35, mupra.
37. Miles v. New South Building and Loan Association, supra note 14;
Munhall v. Boedecker, 44 Ill. App. 131 (1892); Guild v. Baker, 68 N. J. Eq.
61, 59 Atl. 299 (1904); Bettle v. Republic Savings and Loan Association, 71
N. J. Eq. 613, 64 Atl. 176 (1906); Dickinson v. Continental Trust Co., 23
Misc. 489, 52 N. Y. Supp. 672 (Sup. Ct. 1898). But cf. Rline v. Arizona
Mutual Savings and Loan Association, 235 Fed. 694 (C. C. A. 9th, 1916).
38. The first English building and loan association was the Greenwich
Union Building Association, organized in London in 1809. The first association
in America was the Oxford Provident Building Association, organized in Frank-
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aid persons with regular incomes to build homes. Membership in the
first English building society was limited to fifty persons. Each of these
individuals went into the association because he hoped and intended to
secure from it an advance which would enable him to build a home. The
building society itself assumed the responsibility for the construction of
the homes of its advanced members.39
Today, building and loan associations have retained the form and or-
ganization of such a mutual enterprise as this, while their function has
become primarily that of a savings bank. Modern building and loan
associations are not organized to accumulate funds with which to build
homes for a small group of members; they are organized to engage in the
business of borrowing money from one group of persons and lending it
to others.40 The addition of full-paid stock to the original instalment
shares as sources of associations' revenue was a recognition of the changed
function of these institutions, while the issuance of guarantee stock by
some associations now is apparently an attempt to bring their organization
into conformity with the changed function.4 ' The courts in determining
the status of borrowers from an insolvent building and loan association,
and in distributing the assets of such an association, would reach more
equitable results by recognizing the discrepancy between its out-grown
form of organization and its modern function.
DIRECT REGULATION OF THE PUBLIC UTILITY HOLDING
COMPANY
ADVANCES made possible by the Supreme Court's abandonment of the
market-value test for determining the reasonableness of payments by sub-
sidiaries to parent companies,' have without doubt greatly strengthened
fort, Pa., in 1831. See SuNDHEI, LAW oF BUILDING AND LOAN ASsocIATIONs
(3d ed. 1933) 2.
39. For a description of the Greenwich Union Building Association, see
Pratt v. Hutchinson, 15 East 511 (1812).
40. The size of modern building and loan associations is significant in this
respect. In 1930 there were 11,777 associations in the United States, with a total
membership of 12,343,254 persons or an average of more than 1000 members
to each association. The assets of these associations totalled $8,828,612,000.
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OZ THE UNrTED STATES (United States Department of
Commerce, 1931) 279.
41. Associations which issue guarantee stock are organized like non-mutual
savings banks, the holders of this stock having the same relationship to the
'holders of instalment and full-paid stock as that of the bank's stockholders to
its depositors.
1. The inception of the market value test in the regulatory problem of con-
trol of payments to parent companies by their subsidiary operating utilities,
the developing criticism of uch a test among commissions, and its final aban-
-donment by the Supreme Court are traced in Comment (1932) 42 YALE L. J. 65.
For an authoritative account of the developments in control of holding companies
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the indirect method of regulating the public utility holding company. Under
the new rule promulgated by the Court,2 commissions are entitled to take
into consideration, in judging the propriety of intercorporate charges, the
cost to the holding company and its affiliated interests of rendering services
and conveying supplies to subsidiary operating utilities.
3 It has been as-
sumed that such a power will prove adequate to protect consumers of
utility services against possible untoward effects upon rates and service
resulting from activities of the holding company in the public utility field.
Such a conclusion, however, presumes that a judicial declaration of right
to consider the accounts maintained by holding companies 5 is sufficient
to enable commissions accurately to determine the cost to those organiza-
tions of servicing their subsidiaries. But because of the reliance which
commissions are forced to place upon the companies' records, adequate con-
trol requires that a uniform system of accounts be prescribed for holding,
as well as for operating companies.6 Especially is this true in view of the
inherent difficulties in allocating the readiness-to-serve and other overhead
costs incurred by the parent companies. 7 Furthermore, cost determination
will in all probability be complicated by the insistence of the companies,
and the concurrence on the part of commissions and courts, that a reason-
able profit allowance should be included.8 That calculations of reasonable
up to the time of this change, see Lilienthal, The Regulation of Publio Utilitp
Holding Companies (1929) 29 COL. L. REv. 404.
2. Smith v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 282 U. S. 133 (1930); Western Dis-
tributing Co. v. Public Service Commission, 285 U. S. 119 (1932).
3. See Comment (1931) 40 YALE L. J. 809; Note (1931) 44 ]IAnv. L. REv. 833;
(1932) 41 YALE L. J. 929; Re Wisconsin Telephone Co., P. U. R. 1931E, 101,
119 (Wis. P. S. 0. 1931).
4. Cf. MASSACHUSETTS: REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMISSION ON CONTROL AND
CONDUCT OF PUBLIC UTILITIES (1930), in which presently available regulatory
powers are regarded as sufficient.
5. Several states reinforce the judicial declaration by a legislative extension
of commission jurisdiction to the accounts and records of affiliated companies.
Mass. Acts 1930, c. 395; N. Y. Laws 1930, c. 760 § 110(2); Kan. Laws 1931,
c. 239 § 1; Wis. Stat. 1931, § 196.52(4).
6. BONBRIGHT AND MEANS, THE HOLDING COMPANY (1932) 185; Federal
Power Commission, Holding Company Control of Licensees of the Federal Powler
Commission (1932) viii. The Couzens Bill, 71st Cong., 2d Sess., S. B. 3869 (1930),
provides for the prescription of accounts of interstate holding companies.
7. See Lilienthal, Recent Developments in the Law .of Public Utility Holding
Companies (1931) 31 CoL. L. REv. 189, 198. The statement has been made
that cost of service cannot be determined in the telephone business. Annual
Report, American Telephone & Telegraph Co. (1926).
8. Thus the predominant attitude of courts and commissions at the present
time, insofar as it can be ascertained, is t6 the effect that there should be
allowed on intercorporate contracts "cost plus a reasonable profit." Comment
(1932) 42 YALE L. J. 66, 76-78. The Federal Power Commissi6n, however, has
recently limited the allowance on an intercorporate contract to direct and
overhead costs in which was included no profit element whatever. Re Alabama
Power Co., P. U. R. 1932D, 345 (F. P. C. 1932). And the California commis-
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profit will necessitate holding company valuation is clearly foreshadowed.
in a recent investigation by the Kansas Public Service Commission.9 In
considering the propriety of the contract obtaining between Cities Service
subsidiaries and Cities Service Gas Company, the commission declared
that "The reasonableness of the contract is to be tested by what it costs
the Cities Service Gas Company . . . to furnish gas to the affiliated dis-
tributing companies, and [by] the rate of return earned by it on the fair
value of its property used and sefvl in this service." 10 Although the
commission undertook to value the affiliated supply company, it is doubtful
whether any general program of valuation could be successfully under-
taken in the absence of direct accounting control.
The conclusion as to the adequacy of indirect control of the public utility
holding company also disregards all but the most manifest way in which the
holding organizations may adversely affect the public's interest in obtaining
from operating companies maximum utility service at minimum cost. Thus
commission power to eliminate unreasonable charges from the accounts
of operating utilities does not prevent the payment of excessive amounts
by such companies out of surplus, a practice which must ultimately weaken
their credit position and react indirectly upon rates and service to con-
sumers."
1 Enforcement machinery designed to prevent unapproved payments,
such as that recently set up in Wisconsin,' 2 scarcely offers an effective
check. Far more significant than this question of unauthorized payments,
however, is the growing conviction that rates charged the consumer by
the operating companies are swollen by inflation in the security issues of
the parent companies. This conviction, shared by prominent commis-
sioners,' 3 economists,' 4 and representatives of the banking interests,2
5 has
sion appears to have adopted a policy of allowing no profit increment. See
Re Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co., P. U. R. 1930C, 481 (Cal. R. C. 1929).
9. Re Cities Service Co., P. U. R. 1933A, 113 (Kan. P. S. C. 1932).
10. Id. at 130.
11. BONBRIGHT AND MEANS, op. cit. supra note 6, at 181-1S2.
12. Wis. Stat. 1931, § 196.52(6),(7). The machinery created is that of
summary orders by the commission enforced by appropriate court proceS3,
including the use of injunction, upon suit of the commission.
13. Lilienthal, supra note 1, at 424-432; Stochz Ownership in Railroads (1931)
71st Cong., 3d Sess., H. R. 2789, Part I, x, testimony of Commissioner Eastman
of the Interstate Commerce Commission before the House Committee on Inter-
state and Foreign Commerce; cf. Federal Power Commission, Holding Company
Control of Licensees of the Federal Power Commission (1932) vii, ix. And
see Nnw YORK CoimiissioN ON REvisION OF THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSIONS
LAw (1930) VOL. I, Majority Report, at 27, and Report of William J. Donovar,
Counsel, at 145; Merrill, Address Delivered at Yale University (March 20,
1929) 4 U. S. Daily 154, 157.
14. BONBRIGHT AND MEANS, op. cit. supra, note 6, at 167-170; Wells, Public
Regulation of the Holding Company in Public Utilities (1926) 11 AcD. OF
PoL. Sci. PRoc. 708, 711; discussion in (1930) 14 AcAD. oF PoL. Sci- Pnoc.
158-162.
15. See Whitney, Relation of the Banker to the Public Utility (1929) 44
STONE & WEBSTER Joun. 26, 30.
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found expression in recent proposed legislation respecting both the rail-
road 16 and the public utility holding company.' 7 It springs from the belief
that overcapitalization in the financial structure of a holding company, by
creating an impaired credit condition throughout the whole interdependent
system, must ,eventually force commissions to allow an excessive rate of
return to the subsidiary operating companies in order to enable them to
attract necessary capital. Other considerations further compel the same
conclusion as to the interconnection between holding company financing
and consumers' interests.1 s
The inadequacy of control through the operating subsidiaries alone 10
clearly indicates the necessity of the need of direct regulation of the hold-
ing company.20 The very nature of the holding device, however, presents
numerous obstacles. An initial difficulty arises from the problem of
definition, already encountered in experience with indirect control.21 A
However, this conviction is not shared entirely by the courts [Electric Public
Utilities Co. v. Public Service Commission, P. U. R. 1928B, 854, 862 (Md. Cir.
Ct. 1928)]; nor by public utility interests. Pnoc. NAT. Assoc. R. AND PUB.
UTIL. COiM'RS., Thirty-ninth. Annual Convention, 1927, 148-149, remarks of
an official of the Byllesby Company; Senate Committee on Interstate Com-
merce, Investigation of Public Utility Corporations (1928) 70th Cong., 1st
Sess., S. Res. 83, 237-238, testimony of William L. Ransom, counsel for the
utilities; Insull, Is Control of Operating Companies Suffloient? (1930) 14 AOAD.
OF POL. Sci. PROC. 81, 86-87. But contrast the testimony of an executive
officer of the Patomac Edison Electric Company, in Electric Public Utilities
Co. v. Public Service Commission, supra, at 862.
16. See H. R. 11677, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932), providing for extension
of the jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission to railroad holding
companies.
17. The Couzens Bill, supra note 6, provides for the regulation of security
issues of interstate holding companies.
18. Inflation in the security issues of the holding company is regarded as
having an unfavorable effect not only on the rates of the subsidiary operating
companies but also on their service standards. See BONBRIGHT AND MEANS,
op. cit. supra note 6, at 171-174; Stock Ownership in Railroads, supra note 13;
Morehouse, Some Problems of State Control of Public Utility Holding Com-
panies (1929) 5 JOUR. LAND AND PUB. UTIL. ECON. 19, 23. And see the thought-
provoking discussion on the relation of the holding company to the determina-
tion of rates of operating subsidiaries yielding a "fair return", in Cohen,
Confiscatory Rates and Modern Finance (1929) 39 YALE L. J. 151.
19. Several states have sought to strengthen the indirect method of regulation
by increasing commission control over intercorporate contracts through making
such agreements ineffective unless approved as being in the public interest. Mass.
Acts 1930, c. 396; N. Y. Laws 1930, c. 760 § 110(3); Kan. Laws 1931, c. 239 §
2; Wis. Stat. 1931, § 196.52(3). Such action cannot, however, remove the
inherent inadequacy of indirect control. Of. Comment (1931) 40 YALE L. J.
1088, 1093-1094.
20. See the unequivocal statement by the Federal Power Commission in
Holding Company Control of Licensees of the Federal Power Commission (1932)
vii.
21. See the legislation to which reference is made in note 5, supra.
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statutory definition must be so phrased as to exclude insurance companies,
trust companiesr investment trusts and other groups holding utility securi-
ties which are embraced within an unrestricted use of the phrase "holding
company." 22 Yet it must at the same time be inclusive of all the possible
variations of that type of holding organization which retains the stock
of operating companies for purposes of control and renders divers services
to those companies for compensation. There exists a general belief that
both incorporated and unincorporated businesses must be included in order
to prevent evasion through individual activity and the use of such devices
as the business trust and partnership. 3 Furthermore, a definition limited
to organizations possessing legal control is patently unsatisfactory. 4 The
attainment of effective control of a subsidiary is not dependent upon the
legal right to elect a majority of its directors.2 Recognition of this fact
is to be found in both enacted and proposed legislation.20  Moreover, it is
now clear that control can be realized in innumerable ways, as by inter-
locking directorates, chains of successive ownership, personal influence,
and the like. In an effort to embrace all such possibilities the draftsman
of legislation has been forced to resort to long categorical descriptions of
control and/or broad and indefinite terminology. -27  However, in addition
to the fact that such efforts will undoubtedly provide fertile ground for
litigation,28 it is possible that no comprehensive definition can be drafted 2 0
which will avoid the stamp of constitutional invalidity.20 It has been sug-
22. This problem of limiting the scope of definition is considered in BONDTUGHT
AND MEANs, op. cit. supra note 6, at 7; Sloan, Consolidations and Regulation
(1929) 94 ELECTRICAL WORLD 741, 742.
23. See BONBRIGHT AND MEANS, op. cit. supra note 6, at 10; statutes cited in
note 5, supra. Reliance c6uld not be placed upon such decisions as Hemphill v.
Orloff, 277 U. S. 537 (1928), where a Massachusetts trust was held to be within
a Michigan law prescribing certain requirements for foreign "corporations."
24. See BONBRIGHT AND MEANS, op. cit. supra note 6, at 9.
25. See Comment (1932) 42 YALE L. J. 66, 80, n. 79 and 80.
26. See the state legislation referred to in note 5, supra, and the Couzens
Bill, supra note 6.
27. This is indicated by the difficulties encountered by Kansas, New York,
Wisconsin, and Massachusetts in their respective attempts to define the holding
company. The first three finally include "Every person or corporation which
is found by the commission to be exercising substantial influence . . ." N. Y.
Laws 1930, c. 760 § 110 (2) (g) ; Kan. Laws 1931, c. 239 § 1 (2) (f) ; Wis. Stat.
1931, § 196.52 (g). The Massachusetts definition is finally terminated by
including every group which stands in such a position to a utility "that there
is an absence of equal bargaining power" between it and the utility. Mlass. Acts
1930, c. 395(c). Cf. the definition advanced by BONBRIGHT AND IENS, too. cit.
supra note 23.
28. See Chamberlain, Regulation of Public Utility Holding Companics (1931)
17 A. B. A. J. 365, 367.
29. See MASSACHUSETTS: REPoRT OF THE SPECIAL COIMSSION ON CONTflOL
AND CONDUCT OF PuBmc UTILrrIEs (1930), Appendix R, 248-249.
30. See Ransom, Amendments to the New York Public Service Commission
Law in 1930 (1930) 2 N. Y. STATE BAR Assoc. BuLL. 510, 514.
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gested,5 ' however, that such a definition might be sustained by reliance
upon the principle enunciated by the Supreme Court in cases where all-inclu-
sive legislation has been sustained in order to allow a state to protect itself
against recognized evils. 32
When attention is directed to the available methods for constitutionally
exerting direct control over the public utility holding company, it is at
once apparent that consideration has in the main been given to the possi-
bilities embodied in the doctrine of the disregard of the corporate fiction.
The quite prevalent assertion that this device offers a means whereby the
holding company can be subjected to comprehensive regulation 33 is predi-
cated in large part upon supposedly analagous cases involving contract 3 4
or tort 3 5 liability and those in which there was an evident attempt to
employ the corporate fiction to evade some statutory provision or rule
of public policy.30 But it does not necessarily follow that a court's tendency
to disregard the separate entities of parent and subsidiary where the effect
is to impose upon the parent an isolated tort or contract liability indicates
that the court would disregard the entities where the effect would be to
subject the parent to a comprehensive scheme of continuous regulation.
The view has been advanced, however, that the fiction will be the more
readily disregarded in attempted regulation of the holding company because
31. MASSACHUSETTS REPORT, loc. cit. supra note 29.
32. The cases cited for this are Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U. S. 678 (1888)
(law against sale of oleomargarine butter upheld against contention that product
sold by plaintiff was nutritious and wholesome); Booth v. Illinois, 184 U. S. 425
(1902) (statute making illegal the employment of options in transactions in grain
futures sustained over contention of unconstitutionality because directed against
mere options as well as against gambling contracts); Otis v. Parker, 187 U. S. 600
(1903) (California constitutional provision sustained which declared void all
contracts for sales of shares on margin, whether bona fide or gambling contracts).
33. MASSACHUSETTS: REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COIMISSION ON CONTROL
AND CONDUCT OF PUBLIC UTILITIES (1930), Appendix R, 244-246; NEw YOnuK STATE
COMMISSION ON REvIsION OF THE PUBLIC SERVICE COiMISSIONS LAW (1930)
VOL. 1, Report of William J. Donovan, Counsel, 144 (citing testimony of wit-
nesses appearing before the commission); PROC. NAT. Assoc. R. AND PUB.
UTIL. COMM'Rs., Forty-first Annual Convention, 1929, 567; Lilienthal, supra
note 1, at 434. This opinion is not, however, universally shared. See Greenlaw,
The Regulation of Holding Companies (1930) 14 ACAD. OF POL. SOY. POC, 108;
Comment (1931) 40 YALE L. J. 809, 811.
As a method of controlling the railroad holding company, the theory of
disregard of the corporate fiction is advanced in Stock Ownership of Railroads,
supra note 13, at 16 et seq., but dismissed summarily in Ansnes, Federal
Regulation of Railroad Holding Companies (1932) 32 COL. L. REV. 999, 1002-
1003.
34. E. g. Luckenbach Steamship Co. v. W. R. Grace & Co., 267 Fed. 676
(C. C. A. 4th, 1920).
35. E. g. Costan v. Manila Electric Co., 24 F. (2d) 383 (C. C. A. 2d, 1928).
36. E. g. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Minneapolis Civic and
Commerce Association, 247 U. S. 490 (1918), and cases arising under the
Commodities Clause of the Interstate Commerce Act.
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of the public interest involved. 37 It is true that in several instances z9
courts and commissions alike have pressed the doctrine to the extent of
subjecting utility holding companies to some measure of control.3 9 Yet
the majority of these cases have been devitalized in one way or another
by subsequent decisions, 40 while the others represent instances of extreme
domination and absence of all economic distinction between parent and
subsidiary.41 Nor may any of these cases properly be considered as author-
ity for power on the part of commissions to prescribe accounts or regulate
security issues. There is a tendency on the part of the courts to distinguish
between coordination and domination 4 and to require in proof of the
latter evidence which cannot be found in the more common relationships
between holding and operating companies. Especially is this true of the
federal courts. An early intimation of attitude 4 3 is substantiated by two
recent cases. 4 In one of these a determined effort was made in the
district court to break down the corporate fiction, yet the declaration by
37. MIASSACHUSETTS REPORT, loc. cit. supra note 33; Welch, Lifting the
Corporate Veil of Public Scrvice Companics (1931) 19 GEO. L. J. 260, 295-296;
Note (1929) 28 MicH. L. Rnv. 66, 69.
38. Ohio Miniig Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 106 Ohio St. 138, 140
N. E. 143 (1922); Public Service Commission v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tele-
phone Co., P. U. R. 1925B, 545 (Md. P. S. C. 1924); People v. Michigan Bell
Telephone Co., 246 Mich. 198, 224 N. W. 438 (1929); Citizens of Homewood v.
Birmingham Electric Co., P. U. R. 1930D, 463 (Ala. P. S. C. 1930); Re Alabama
Power Co., supra note 8.
39. But not all courts and commissions have disregarded the separate entities
where there edsted evidence of evasion of statutory or public policy. Pat-
terson Orchard Co. v. Southwest Arkansas Utilities Corp., 179 Ark. 1029, 18
S. W. (2d) 1028 (1929); Re Borough of Brookville, P. U. R. 1929D, 483 (Pa.
P. S. C. 1929).
40. The Maryland commission was reversed in Chesapeake & Potomac
Telephone Co. v. Whitman, 3 F. (2d) 938 (D. Md. 1925). The Michigan
Supreme Court retracted from its position very substantially in People v.
Michigan Bell Telephone Co., P. U. R. 1929E, 27 (1929). Following the decision
of the Ohio Supreme Court, the stockholdings of the parent company in its
subsidiaries were transferred to the parent's own stockholders, and this variation
was sufficient to defeat the doctrine. See Southern Ohio Power Co. v. Public
Utilities Commission, 110 Ohio St. 246, 143 N. E. 700 (1924).
41. Citizens of Homewood v. Birmingham Electric Co.; Re Alabama Power
Co., both supra note 38.
42. See Ballantine, Separate Entity of Parcizt and Subsidiary Corporations
(1925) 14 CArin. L. REv. 12, 17.
43. Houston v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 259 U. S. 318 (1922);
Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Service Commission, 262 U. S. 276
(1923). Though the United Fuel Gas Cases, 278 U. S. 300 (1929), 278 U. S.
322 (1929), have been cited as involving a refusal to maintain the corporate
fiction, they cannot be so regarded. See Comment (1931) 19 CALIP. L. REV.
431, 440-441.
44. Michigan Bell Telephone Co. v. Odell, 45 F. (2d) 180 (E. D. Mich. 1930);
Illinois Bell Telephone Co. v. Moynihan, 38 F. (2d) 77 (N. D. Ill. 1930), rcv'd
(on other grounds), Smith v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 282 U. S. 133 (1930).
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the lower court that the array of supporting evidence was insufficient was
upheld by the Supreme Court.45
These considerations would seem to point to the conclusion that the
possibilities of disregarding the corporate fiction are strictly limited to
extreme and exceptional instances.46 However, it has been urged that
the unfavorable judicial attitude now obtaining can be overcome by a
declaration of legislative intent that the corporate separation of parent
and subsidiary should be disregarded. 47 This view is predicated upon the
belief that the present attitude results from a reluctance on the part of
the courts to destroy entities the creation of which is specifically authorized
by the legislative branch of the government, and consequently that the
enunciation of a definite statutory policy embodying the principle would
remove any such cause for hesitation. It has been suggested 48 that the
validity of such legislation could be successfully defended on the analogy
of Frick v. Webb.49 That case involved the validity of the California Alien
Land Law which prohibits aliens ineligible to citizenship from acquiring
lands, and lays down like prohibitons on corporatons in which a majority
of the issued capital stock is owned by such aliens. The Supreme Court,
in holding the law constitutional, appears to have expressly consented to
this legislative disregard of corporate entity. Or perhaps the test of con-
stitutionality could be successfully met by adopting the tactics advocated
by the Minority Report in the recent New York investigation as a means
of inducing judicial approval of the fixed rate base concept.5 0 Those tactics
involve a direct attack upon the constitutional question, the validity of the
proposed legislation being supported upon broad economic grounds and the
reasonableness and constructive character of the legislative solution to
the problem presented. 1
Whether any substantial degree of success would attend such efforts
is, however, open to serious question. The present general attitude dis-
played by the courts and the definite language of the Supreme Court in
Smith v. Illinois Belt Telephone Company 52 cannot but cast doubt upon
the efficacy of disregarding the corporate entity as a method of subjecting
the holding company to direct regulation. At least it seems pertinent
45. The case in question was that involving the Illinois Bell Telephone
Company. See the discussion of this attempt and a description of the evidence
presented, in Comment (1932) 42 YALE L. J. 66, 70-71.
46. This appears to be the conclusion reached by the Commissioners in the
Tecent New York investigation. NEw YORK STATE COMMISSION ON REVISION
OF THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSIONS LAW (1930) VOL. 1, Majority Report, 27.
47. See MASSACHUSETTS REPORT, loc. cit. supra note 33; Stock Ownership in
Railroads, supra note 13, at 29-34; of. Lilienthal, supra note 1, at 434.
48. Stock Ownership in Railroads, supra note 47.
49. 263 U. S. 326 (1923).
50. NEW YORK STATE COM MISSION ON REVISION OF THE PUBLIC SERVIcE!
'COM ISSIONS LAW (1930) VOL. 1, Minority Report.
51. Ibid; Bauer, New York Survey of Public Utility Regulation (1930) 20
AM. EcoN. REV. 381, 388, 392.
52. 282 U. S. 133 (1930). See note 45, supra.
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to develop other possible constitutional devices whereby such regulation
might be realized. One such possible device for regulation might be
the redefinition of the term "public utility" so as to include holding com-
panies, either by an outright declaration that holding companies are
public utilities or indirectly by an extension of the term to every cor-
poration controlling an operating utility plant. The success of the latter
method is doubtful, however, if efforts which have been made to bring
holding companies within the scope of statutes employing the term "con-
trol" are any criterion.53  Mloreover, there is the further disadvantage
to both devices of control in that holding companies do not bear the
typical characteristics of the public utility. Traditionally, a public utility
is an operating company furnishing the public directly with certain essential
services, 5 4 and while some courts and commissions have tended to place
less emphasis upon direct service to the public,55 an analysis of the cases
representing this trend reveals that the declarations therein of the public
utility status of various supply companies are only for the purpose of
exacting relatively minor requirements.0 And several of the decisions
are justified on rather special grounds.
luch the same difficulties would be encountered in any attempt to exert
direct control under a legislative declaration to the effect that the holding
company is affected with public interest. Although undoubtedly broader
than the .public utility concept, that of affectation with public interest
is clustered about with notions of devotion to public use, special privilege,
and monopoly position which do not seem to fit the holding company
situation.57  Furthermore, the Supreme Court has been disinclined to
53. Toledo Traction, Light & Power Co. v. Smith, 205 Fed. 643 (N. D.
Ohio 1913); State Public Utilities Commission v. Romberg, 275 Ill. 432, 114
N. E. 191 (1916). Contra: Re Central Public Service Corp., P. U. R. 1930A,
32 (Md. P. S. C. 1929) (opinion of the commission's counsel). Such unfavorable
results are not surprising, for certainly control through stock ownership alone,
as is assumed here, will not subject the holding company to regulation when
the extensive factual economic control found in the disregard of the corporate
entity cases is usually insufficient. Cf. Lilienthal, supra note 1, at 410-411.
54. See NASH, Tnn ECONOMIICS OF PUBLIC UTMrrms (2d ed. 1931) c. 2;
BONBRIGHT AND MEANS, op. cit. supra note 6, at 201; Lilienthal, supra note 1,
at 409.
55. See North Carolina Public Service Co. v. Southern Power Co., 282 Fed.
837 (C. C. A. 4th, 1922); Miller v. Southern Indiana Power Co., 184 Ind. 370,
111 N. E. 308 (1916); Gallatin Natural Gas Co. v. Public Service Commission,
79 Mont. 269, 256 Pac. 373 (1927); Southern Oklahoma Power Co. v. Corporation
Commission, 96 Okla. 53, 220 Pac. 370 (1923); Franke v. Johnstown Fuel
Supply Co., 70 Pa. Super. Ct. 446 (1918); Re State Line Generating Co.,
P. U. R. 1929B, 97 (Ind. P. S. C. 1928); Re West Missouri Power Co., P. U. R.
1929A, 61 (Mo. P. S. C. 1928); REPORTS AND OPINIONs, AT'VY GEN. OF INDIANA
(1927-1928) 281, 296.
56. Cf. BONBRIGHT AND MEANS; Lilienthal, both loc. cit. supra note 54;
Morehouse, supra note 18, at 25; Comment (1931) 40 YALE L. J. 1088, 1094.




favor any expansion of the public interest concept,58 However, there is
a promising possibility that the desired regulation may be achieved by
the more intensive control of businesses presently conceived to be within
the scope of the concept. The auspiciousness of this method of subjecting
holding companies to direct regulation may on first consideration seem
slight indeed, in view of the Wolff Packing case, involving the consti-
tutionality of state legislation providing for the regulation of wages in
meat packing establishments. The state court, declaring that the question
presented was not whether meat packing is affected with a public interest,
but whether the wages of employees in such an industry are so affected,
had sustained the legislative action on the ground that "In all business.
enterprises affected with a public interest rates or charges and wages
are so bound together that they cannot be separated." r9 But the Supreme
Court, although following the state court's view-as to the issues involved,
found the legislation invalid.60
The decision in the Wolff case, however, is by no means determinative.
The Court's observation that "The extent to which regulation may reason-
ably go varies with different kinds of business," 0l when interpreted in
the light of Wilson v. New,62 sustaining federal war-time regulation of
the wages of railroad labor, suggests that the Court may be willing to
go further where vital industries are involved. This indication is borne
out in several respects. The Court's recent shift in attitude with respect
to the proper measure of the reasonableness of intercorporate payments
reveals that it is fully aware of the position of power which the holding
company has assumed in the public utility field, and that it has substan-
tially altered its earlier conceptions regarding non-interference by govern-
ment in the domain of internal utility management. The series of cases 03
in which there has been sustained an increasingly comprehensive scheme
of regulation of agents in the insurance business, yield strong support
to the same view. Beginning with the upholding of regulation of the
practices of insurance' agents because "it necessarily follows that, as
insurance is affected with a public interest, those engaged in it or who
bring about its consummation are affected with the same interest and
subject to regulation as it is," 64 the Supreme Court in the O'Gorman
58. Cf. Scott, Judicial Logic as Applied in Delimiting the Concept of Busi-
ness "Affected with a Public Interest" (1930) 19 KY. L. J. 16.
59. Court of Industrial Relations v. Charles Wolff Packing Co., 109 Kan.
629, 641, 201 Pac. 418, 424 (1921).
60. Charles Wolff Packing Co. v. State of Kansas, 262 U. S. 522 (1923).
The significance of the litigation as an effort at intensive regulation is con-
sidered in KEEZER AND MAY, THE PUBLIC CONTROL OF BUSINESS (1930) 174-182.
61. Supra note 60, at 539.
62. 243 U. S. 332 (1917).
63. La Tourette v. McMaster, 248 U. S. 465 (1919); Stipcich v. Metropolitan
Life Insurance Co., 277 U. S. 311 (1928); O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire
Insurance Co., 282 U. S. 251 (1931).
64. La Tourette v. McMaster, 248 U. S. 465, 467 (1919).
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case 6 5 has now sustained regulation of the compensation paid to insurance
agents. Over the objection that such regulation constituted an invasion
of the internal domain of business, the New Jersey law was declared
constitutional under the state's police power on the ground that "The
agent's compensation, being a percentage of the premium, bears a direct
relation to the rate charged the insured. The percentage commonly al-
lowed is so large that it is a vital element in the rate structure and may
seriously affect the adequacy of the rate." 61 The language and decision
in this case are doubly significant. They furnish a most favorable analogy
on which to predicate the case for more complete control of the utility
holding company. Even more important, they seem clearly to mark a
-distinct change in the Court's attitude as to what degree of proof will
be required for legislative attempts at intensive regulation to withstand
the test of judicial scrutiny. Whereas in the earlier cases the validity
of such legislation is measured by the severe test of affectation with
public interest, the measure employed in the O'Gornan decision is that
of reasonableness of means and objective under the police power, admit-
tedly a less exacting criterion.67
Surely there is now available sufficient evidence to demonstrate the
reasonableness of legislation looking to the comprehensive control of the
holding company; or even to persuade the Court of its validity under
the more rigorous test of affectation with public interest. In considering
the economic necessity of direct control, allusion has already been made
to the manifold ways in which the activities of holding companies inti-
nately affect the rate and service standards of their subsidiaries. The
Federal Trade Commission's exhaustive inquiry into utility practices 63
and the investigation in New York State conducted by the special Revision
Commission 9 are replete with evidence demonstrating the vital influence
-which holding companies exercise over the conduct of the utility business
in all its forms. The extraordinary degree to which the parent companies
have taken over the actual functions of the operating utilities is revealed
in investigations into the activities of specific holding groups recently
completed by the regularly constituted Kansas and New York commis-
sions. 70 Thus the Kansas commission found that the subsidiaries of the
Cities Service Company were furnished with seventeen distinct services
by Gas Service Company and with another twelve by Henry L. Doherty
65. O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 282 U. S. 251 (1931).
66. Id at 257.
67. See Hamilton, Affectation with Public Intercst (1930) 39 YALn L. J.
1089. Cf. Jennings, The Police Power as the Source of Public Utility Legislation
(1930) 3 DAK. L. REv. 91.
68. Federal Trade Commission, Utility Corporations (1928-1932) 70th Cong.,
1st Sess., Sen. Doc. 92.
69. NEw YoRK STATE CommiIssIoN ON REvisioN OF THE PUBLIC SEnVICE
CommIsIoNs LAW (1930).
70. Be Cities Service Co., supra note 9; Re New York State Electric & Gas
,Corp., P. U. R. 1932E, 1 (N. Y. P. S. C. 1932).
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and Company.7x The result of this situation from a financial point of
view is strikingly indicated in another recent investigation by the New
Hampshire commission.72 It there appears that a very significant part
of the income of the operating units of the Associated Gas and Electric
System is flowing to the parent company in the form of dividends, interest
on short term borrowings, and payment for an infinite number of ser-
vices. Even before the revelations of the last few years it could accurately
be said that "If there is any reason for public regulation at all, it extends
at the present time to the holding companies. . . . To a large extent,
,because holding companies have not been brought under control, they
have absorbed increasingly the actual functions of operation." 73 Certainly
it would be difficult to conceive of a stronger case for intensive regulation
than that presented by the dominance of the holding company in the
public utility field.
CAPITAL RECLASSIFICATION AS AN ALTERATION OF
PREFERENTIAL RIGHTS UNDER APPRAISAL STATUTES
WHERE corporate changes effected by the majority are of a fundamental
character, such as merger, consolidation, or sale of assets, and affect the
nature of the enterprise into which stockholders have entered, a dissenter
is generally allowed by statute to withdraw from the corporation and
receive payment for his shares.' But less solicitude has been shown for
71. There was, however, considerable overlapping.
72. Re New Hampshire Gas & Electric Co., P. U. R. 1931D, 225 (N. H. P. S. C.
1931).
73. Bauer, Electric Light and Power Utilities-Discussion (1929) 19 AM.
ECON. Ruv. (Supp.) 219, 221.
1. For discussions of appraisal statutes in general, see Weiner, Payment
of Dissenting Shareholders (1927) 27 COL. L. Rnv. 547; Levy, Rights of Dis-
senting Shareholders to Appraisal and Payment (1930) 15 CORN. L. Q. 420;
Lattin, Remedies of Dissenting Shareholders Under Appraisal Statutes (1931)
45 HARe. L. Rnv. 233.
For citations of statutes see PARKER, CORPORATION MANUAL (33d ed. 1932).
Twenty-four states have appraisal provisions for merger or consolidation:
Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, Now
Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South
Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia. The same states have provisions incident to
a sale of corporate assets, with the exception of Delaware, Minnesota, Nevada,
North Carolina, Pennsylvania. The following give appraisal in the event of
sale alone: District of Columbia, Massachusetts, Missouri, New Hampshire,
Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont.
In addition to appraisal where there is alteration of the preferences of out-
standing shares, toward which the inquiry of this comment is directed, there
are scattered provisions incident to issuance of stock to employees. Of. N. Y.
STOCK CORP. LAw (1929) § 14; N. J. LAws (1920) c. 175, § 2 (c); see Fordham,
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the minority in the event of amendments to the corporate articles which
pertain to or affect the status of a class of stockholders.2 This is illustrated
not only by the comparatively limited number of protective statutory pro-
visions, but also by the type of relief afforded therein, which usually takes
the form merely of an opportunity to vote upon the proposed amendment.3
However, a few statutes can by interpretation or implication be said to
give affirmative relief, in making at least the alteration of preferential
Some Legal Aspects of Employee Stock-Purclwsc Plans (1930) 8 N. C. L.
Rnv. 161, 165; sale of assets on voluntary dissolution for securities in another
corporation, N. Y. STOCK CORP. LAw (1929) § 105 (9); change in corporate
objects, LA. GEN. STAT. (Dart, 1932) § 1132; MAss. GEN. L ws (1921) c. 156,
§ 46; Omo GEN. CODE (Page, 1931) § 8623-15; extension of term of corporato
existence, LA. GEN. STAT. (Dart, 1932) § 1132.
2. The distinction between so-called fundamental changes, and non-funda-
mental changes (such as capital reclassification) was observed, however in-
articulately, at common law. Thus the right of dissenters to exact payment
for their shares was granted only in cases in which the transaction to which
objection was being made so affected the stockholders' interest as to induce
the court to treat it as a conversion. See for example, Lauman v. Lebanon
Valley Rr., 30 Pa. 42 (1858) (consolidation); International & G. N. Rr. v.
Bremond, 53 Tex. 96 (1880) (consolidation); Tanner v. Lindell Ry., 180 Mo.
1, 79 S. W. 155 (1904) (consolidation); Koehler v. St. Mary's Brewing Co.,
228 Pa. 648, 77 AtI. 1016 (1910) (sale); Kremer v. Public Drug Co., 41 S. D.
365, 170 N. W. 571 (1919) (sale); Wunsch v. Consolidated Laundry Co., 116
Wash. 44, 198 Pac. 383 (1921) (sale). It seems that a dissenter from a con-
solidation need not confine himself to his remedy under an available appraisal
statute. See Barnett v. Philadelphia Market Co., 218 Pa. 649, 654, 67 At].
912, 913 (1907).
On the other hand, appraisal and payment in the event of alteration of the
financial structure are wholly statutory remedies. However, minority stock-
holders could limit unfair or unauthorized actions of the majority in this regard
by injunction. For a thorough discussion of the power to change the charter
by amendment or to accept amendments offered by the state, see Levy, oupra
note 1, at 423, 425, n. 18, 19. See also Note (1930) 15 CoRN. L. Q. 279.
3. ARK. LAws (1931) c. 255, § 5; CAL. CIV. CODE (Deering, 1931) § 362a;
CoLO. Comp. LAws (1932) § 2278; DEL. LAws (1931) c. 129, § 8 (1); FLA.
CoirP. LAws (1927) § 6532; IDAHO CODE ANN. (1932) § 29-145; IND. ANN.
STAT. (Burns, Supp. 1930) § 4846 (b); LA. GEN. STAT. (Dart, 1932) § 1122;
ME. LAws (1931) c. 182, § 48; MIcH. PuB. ACTS (1931) Act 327, § 43; Mss.
CODE ANN. (1930) § 4133; R. I. LAws (1927) c. 1008, § 50; TENN. ANN. CODm
(Shannon, 1932) § 3721; W. VA. CODE (1931) c. 31, Art. 1, § 12.
A typical provision is that of Delaware: . . . if any such proposed amend-
ment would alter or change the preferences, special rights or powers given to
any one or more classes of stock, by the certificate of incorporation, so as to
affect such class or classes of stock adversely, or would increase or decrease
the amount of the authorized stock of such class or classes of stock or would
increase or decrease the par value thereof, then the holders of the stock of
each class of stuck so affected by the amendment shall be, entitled to vote as
a class upon such amendment, whether by the terms of the certificate of incor-
poration such class be entitled to vote or not.... "
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rights a ground for appraisal, 4 and one, that of New York,5 contains a
specific provision to this effect. But the three reported cases which have
arisen under this statute provide no rule of thumb as to what constitutes
an alteration of preferential rights. In Dresser v. Donner Steel Co.,0 the
imposition of a new class of preferred stock with preferences prior to the
preferred already outstanding was held not to be within the statute, since
the technical preferences and the priorities of the issued shares relative to
the other existing stock remained the same. Since it was clear that the
value of the claimants' preferences was in fact depressed, the decision
suggested that the statute would be applicable only in cases in which
there was a technical alteration. The subsequent case of Silberkravs v.
Schaffer Stores Co.7 rather substantiated this view. Pursuant to amend-
ment to the corporate charter, stock preferred as to assets alone was
retired and replaced by twice the amount of new stock preferred both
4. In addition to the New York statute, infra note 5, see the following:
IDAHO CODE ANN. (1932) § 29-149(1) (giving the right to appraisal and pay-
ment if the amendment "changes the rights of the holders of any outstanding
shares" in accordance with the provisions of § 29-145, which includes authority
to change the rights of shareholders, to authorize shares with preferences to
those of classes outstanding, etc.); LA. GEN. STAT. (Dart, 1932) § 1132 (when
the amendment changes the rights of holders of outstanding shares); Outo
GEN. CODE (Page, 1931) §§ 8623-15, 8623-72 ("if the purpose of the amend-
ment is to change the express terms and provisions of any outstanding shares
having preference."); PHRILtPPINE IsLANDS L. (1928) Act 3518, § 18 ("If the
amendment ... should consist in any change in the rights of holders of any
class ... or would restrict the rights of any shareholder"); of. MAss. GEN.
LAws (1921) c. 156, §§ 42, 46; N. H. Pus. LAWs (1926) c. 225, §§ 40, 54.
5. N. Y. STOCK CORP. LAW (1929) § 38 (12): "If the certificate alters the
preferential rights of any outstanding shares, any holder of such shares not
voting in favor of such alteration . . . may object thereto and demand pay-
ment for his shares, and thereupon such stockholder or the corporation may
have his shares appraised. ... 
6. 247 N. Y. 553, 161 N. E. 179 (1928), aff'g (without majority opinion, but
with dissenting opinion of three judges) 221 App. Div. 786, 223 N. Y. Supp.
864 (4th Dep't 1928). For criticism of this decision see Note (1928) 37 YALE
L. J. 1153.
7.. 250 N. Y. 242, 165 N. E. 279 (1929); Note (1929) 38 YALE L. J. 989;
Note (1929) 29 COL. L. REv. 835; Note (1929) 7 N. Y. U. L. Q. R.v. 206
(suggesting the necessity of a statutory definition of "an alteration of pre-
ferential rights").
Cf. with the Silberkraus case, Zoe K. Ames v. Godchaux Sugars, Inc., 228
App. Div. 801, 239 N. Y. Supp. 917 (1st Dep't 1930), aff'# without opinion the
unreported decision of Mr. Justice Frankenthaler, January 15, 1930, at a
Special Term of the Supreme Court, New York County. There, dividends had
been unpaid for five years on the 7% cumulative preferred stock, having ac-
cumulated to $40 a share. By amendment of its financial structure the cor-
poration changed this stock into new preferred, with common stock offered in
payment of the unpaid dividends. A preferred stockholder who objected to
the reclassification was awarded an appraisal.
as to capital distribution and earnings, but limited to dividends of 75,
and callable at $110. The old stock had the right of unlimited partici-
pation in earnings and was in fact paid 10%. This transaction was held
to be within the statute, and the court, emphasizing the fact that a pre-
ference had been wholly extinguished and a new one substituted, s granted
an appraisal. But the recent case of It re International Szpcrpowcr
CorporationO evidences a more liberal construction of the statute. New
York courts there held that a reduction of the stated value of no-par
stock with the consequent creation of a surplus, said by the court to be
available for dividends, was an "alteration of preferential rights" of
complaining stockholders, since the effect of the transaction would be to
entitle them to only their dividend priority of $2.25 over common in the
sum thus converted into surplus. Had the sum been retained as capital,
and distributed as such, complainants would have been entitled to their
dissolution preference of $40 per share.
It would seem from this case that the operation of the appraisal pro-
vision will not be limited to situations in which there is merely an alter-
8. See In re Silberkraus, supra note 7, at 245, 165 N. E. at 180. The
court distinguished the Dresser case, saying at 1S0: "There a new class of
preferred stock was superimposed upon an existing preferred class. The old
preferred was not retired, nor in principle at least, were its preferential rights
displaced. They remained the same, subject only to the preferences of the
new class."
9. N. Y. L. Journal, Sept. 7, 1932, at 831; aff'd without opinion, 236 App.
Div. 843 (1st Dep't 1932). The Empire Power Corporation, whose assets con-
sisted largely of securities of other corporations, had outstanding 77,OOQ shares
of no-par preferred stock at a stated value of $92.63 per share, 400,000 shares
of no-par participating stock at a stated value of $31.50 per share, and
400,000 shares of no-par common stock at a stated value of $10 per share,
all having a capital value of $23,732,510. The preferred was $G cumulative, and
preferred as to $100 out of assets upon dissolution. The participating was
entitled to cumulative preferential dividends of $2.25 per annum and upon
dissolution, to a preference of $40 per share over common. Common was to
share in surplus or undivided profits in an amount equal to the aggregate
paid to the participating, after which, common and participating were to share
equally. On June 10, 1932 an amended certificate was filed pursuant to § 3G(i)3,
N. Y. STOCK CORP. LAW, reducing the capital to $2,192,500, and providing that
the capital should be $2.50 in respect to every issued share without par value,
plus such amounts "as ... by resolution of the Board of Directors may be
transferred thereto." The $21,540,500 which as a result was liberated from
the capital account was designated surplus "to be used and dealt with as the
Board of Directors might determine," and was on the same day disposed of
by resolution as follows: $6,940,500 was transferred to capital in respect to
the preferred shares, and $2,150,000 in respect to participating shares; and
the remaining $12,450,000 was transferred to an account then created, entitled
"capital surplus." It was specifically provided that the respective designations,
preferences, etc. were to remain unchanged. The result of all the transactions
-was that the preferred stated value was the same, and both common and
participating were reduced to one-fourth their original stated value.
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ation of rights in praesenti,0 particularly in light of the fact that in
the Superpower transactions it was expressly provided that the respective
designations, preferences, etc. were to remain unchanged. On the other
hand since the doctrine of the Dresser case was not repudiated it seems
settled that acts resulting only in a reduction of the value of a prefer-
ence will not necessarily give a right to an appraisal. It therefore appears
that the statute is mandatory solely in the event of a strict alteration
of terms, and in any other situation the court will to a considerable
degree be free to exercise its discretion.1 1
If in the Superpower case the resolution of the directors had definitely
provided for the immediate distribution of the surplus in large amounts
as "dividends," 12 petitioners would clearly have been harmed by the
reduction in the funds to which they might look upon dissolution, and
by the diminution of their preference over common. The same injury
may obtain if "dividends" hereafter declared dissipate the surplus-a
possibility which the court assumed exists. However, despite the fact
that a real surplus created by a reduction of capital stock is distribut-
able,' 3 it is generally said that such sums paid to the stockholders are a
10. This view finds support in the statutory use of the phrase "prefer-
ential rights" in the section under discussion as compared with the use of
the word "preferences" in related sections. Cf. N. Y. STOCK CORP. LAW (1929)
§ 37(3)(c); see also § 36(11).
11. Complete freedom may be somewhat curtailed where the statute requires
prejudice to the stockholder as a result of the transaction. Of. Onio GEN.
CODE (Page, 1931) § 8623-15.
12. Petitioners seemed to assume that the management desired the amend-
ment for the primary purpose of declaring the surplus thereby created as
"dividends." But the assumption may perhaps be unjustified in the light of
an affidavit by the corporate treasurer negativing any such intention. It was
stated therein that the securities comprising the assets of the company were
carried at purchase price, and in view of unsettled market conditions together
with depreciated value, it was deemed essential that the capital account be
brought safely within the known asset values.
Current periodicals are replete with items pointing to a general movement
today to write down capital structures to absorb losses occasioned by recent
conditions, and to prevent, upon a return to satisfactory business levels, heavier
Federal income taxes because of depreciation already absorbed. For a discussion
of the practice of writing down for reasons bther than income taxes, see Horn-
berger, Accounting For No Par Stocks During the Depression (1933) 8 Tnu
ACCOUNTING Rnviuw 58.
13. Strong v. The Brooklyn Cross-Town Rr., 93 N. Y. 426 (1883); HATFIELD,
ACCOUNTING (1931) 293; REITER, PROFITs, DIVIDENDS AND THE LAWv (1926) 235;
cf. Greene v. Boardman, 143 Misc. 201 (Sup. Ct. 1932) (where directors im-
paired capital by retiring preferred stock and declaring dividends, the illegality
of the act was held to be cured by a subsequent reduction of capital through
substitution of no-par stock (of less value) for the common). See dissenting
opinion of Lehman, J. in Small v. Sullivan, 245 N. Y. 343, 360, 157, N. E. 201,
266 (1927) ("as the law now stands, a corporation ...might lawfully reduce
its capital and distribute its surplus.")
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return of capital,14 which must of course be made in accordance with
capital preferences.15 Under this view the preferred or participating
stockholders would not suffer an injury to their interests.
On the other hand, even assuming that the sum will never be distributed
and that the present assets of the corporation will remain in stathl quo
ante, there still may be prejudice to the preferred stockholder in thatdividends may later be declared out of current earnings which would
otherwise go to make good an existing or prospective impairment of
capital. 16 For although the existence of injury must be determined as
of the date of the amendment, it is equally true that a present decision
must concern itself with the future incidents of the transaction. Thepossibility of prejudicial manipulation of the corporate structure and
assets a few years hence as a result of present transactions is, for thepurposes of appraisal, equivalent to demonstrable injury. Thus it maybe desirable that by virtue of the threat of appraisals in ease there is a
reduction of capital and creation of a surplus, preferred stockholders begiven a definite check on the management policies. Moreover, no-par
stock was created to eliminate fictional values of corporate shares,1T andin the case of true no-par stock a share represents merely the owner's
aliquot interest in the business. But where "no-par" stock is given a
stated value, it is like par stock in that the capital account must be equalledby at least the same amount of assets which are automatically frozen
against management handling. Therefore, without a distribution of more
stock a reduction of stated no-par value is equivalent to a reduction of
Some statutes provide for distribution of a surplus upon reduction of capital.CAL. Crv. CODE (Deering, 1931) § 348b; AID. LAws (1931) c. 480 § 32(5);
NEv. LAws (1931) c. 224 § 7.
14. MONTGO ERY, AUDITING TnEORY AND PRACrxCE (3d. ed. 1922) 295; REVIE,
op. cit. supra note 13, at 237; WiCKERsHAAi, STOCK WITHOUT PAR VALUE (1927)
§ 63.
15. A return of capital must be according to preferences. Cf. N. Y. STOCKCORP. LAW (1929) § 36 (15): If the capital is reduced, ctc., the certificate mayprovide that the excess be returned to stockholders "according to their respect-ive rights"; cf. also § 37 (4) : if the capital is reduced, there must be an affidavit
of officers "stating that the proposed reduction, or any distribution of assetsmade pursuant thereto, etc." (italics ours). This would appear to indicate thatthe legislature contemplated that the amounts distributed would be treated as
assets and not as dividends.
16. See N. Y. STOCK CORP. LAw (1929) § 58: "No corporation shall declare
or pay any dividends which shall impair its capital or capital stock, . . . norpay -any dividend or make any distribution of assets ... whether upon a re-duction of the number of its shares or of its capital or capital stock, unless thevalue of its assets remaining after the payment of such dividend, or after suchdistribution of assets, as the case may be, shall be at least equal to the aggre-gate amount of its debts and liabilities including capital or capital stock: as
the case may be."
17. Berle, Problems of Non-Par Stock (1925) 25 CoL. L. REv. 43, 50.
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par value, and, it is arguable, works a prejudice similar to that resulting
from a change in the distributive share on dissolution
18
It is probable, however, that a court will be reluctant to pass judgment
upon a particular transaction the results of which may be seen only in
the future, inasmuch as it may amount to a substitution of its judgment
for that of the corporate managers; and it is likely that the equities in
favor of the claimant for an appraisal will be carefully scrutinized before
the court will see fit to undertake a detailed consideration of the trans-
action itself. If the petitions for appraisal are obviously hold-up or nuis-
ance claims which will impede the corporate body in the exercise of a
necessary and legitimate function, it may be expected that the statute
will be strictly, even literally applied without further investigation. 
And
even when the mala fides of the claimant is not so clearly defined, a narrow
construction may prevail if it appears that the granting of the appraisal
will place the dissenter in an unfairly strategic position. The elements
which enter into this consideration are valuation,
19 which may be predi-
cated on market value,20 asset or liquidating value,
21 or earnings and
worth as a going business; 22 the type of business; and the nature of the
transaction to which objbction is being made.
In the case of an ordinary industrial in failing circumstances a disso-
lution and forced sale, because of the non-liquidity of the corporate assets,
would bring the stockholder much less than a statutory appraisal of 
his
shares under the "asset or liquidating value" standard. But a corpora-
tion like that in the Superpower case, whose assets consist of shares of
stock in other corporations, presents a different situation, and a forced
liquidation would be as lucrative to the stockholder as an appraisal based
,on "asset or liquidating value". Moreover, although it has been nowhere
intimated that the test should differ in the event of capital reclassifica-
tion from that of merger, consolidation or sale, it is clear that the former
is intended to insure the continuance of the going concern, and to choose
18. In both situations the amount which the stockholder is assured of getting
on dissolution is reduced. However while prejudice is certain where there is a
literal alteration of the asset preferences, it is only probable where the stated
value is reduced, but the preference on dissolution is unaltered.
19. For discussions of 'valuation, see Robinson, Dissenting Shareholders:
Their Right to Dividends and the Valuation of Their Shares (1932) 32 COL.
L. Ray. 60; and articles cited in note 1, supra.
20. Another test which has been prescribed by statute is book value 
of the
shares as a minimum value. This has been criticized as unsound. See Robinson,
supra note 19, at 74; Borg v. International Silver Co., 11 F. (2d) 147, 152
(C. C. A. 2d, 1926); cf. Cabble v. Cabble, 111 App. Div. 426, 97 N. Y. Supp.
773 (2d Dep't 1906).
21. This standard has been suggested on the ground that a dissolution is
substantially effected by merger, consolidation, or sale of corporate assets.
People v. Ballard, 134 N. Y. 269, 32 N. E. 54 (1892); Matter of Timmils, 200
N. Y. 177, 93 N. E. 522 (1910); Murrin v. Arehbald Coal Co., 232 N. Y. 541,
134 N. E. 563 (1921).
22. See Robinson, supra note 19, at 76, 77.
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liquidating value would not be unduly favoring the dissenter.2 Further,
while there may be some doubt as to the fairness of a standard of "earn-
ings" and "worth as a going business" in the appraisal of shares of an
ordinary industrial, such an objection will not be presented in the case
of an investment trust where this basis must be rejected because of the
practical difficulty of its ascertainment.24 Finally market value would
not be prejudicial to either type of corporation in times of ordinary
market conditions unless the shares are not offered on the public exchange.
These considerations, although not mentioned by the court in the Super-
power case, may well have underlain a decision to proceed to a deter-
mination of the complainant's right to an appraisal on the merits of the
particular transaction involved, since to do so would not be unfair to
the corporation.
23. To give asset or liquidating value upon an appraisal arising out of
transactions calculated to improve the business seems fair enough to the cor-
poration upon the hypothesis that in the future the company will be in a better
condition, and shares of stock therein worth more as a consequence.
24. See Robinson, supra note 19, at 74, 75, 76. As this author indicates,
an appraisal in the instances where the sole assets of a corporation are shares
of stock of other corporations would "lead logically to the Herculean task of
delving into the value of each of [those] corporations". The same objections
apply, of course, to the asset, or liquidating value standard, in less degree.
See also Lattin, supra note 1, at 260.
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